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ABSTRACT
State Spatial Practices and Uneven Development:
Flexible Rescaling in Appalachia
Jacquelyn Core

Geographic theories regarding uneven development, including Neil Smith’s convergence
of Marxist theory and spatial development and David Harvey’s development of scalar fix and
later conceptual development of the process of capital accumulation, historically have focused
primarily on how and why uneven development occurs. Research to date has provided only a
cursory examination of what role, if any, the state plays in impacting uneven development, has
not endeavored to characterize the state as an active, purposeful spatial player in the process of
uneven development, and has not conceptualized how the state impacts uneven development
through spatial practices, if the state does in fact do so. This dissertation attempts to fill that gap
in the literature by examining the state’s role in uneven development and theorizing that the state
plays an active spatial role in impacting uneven development to benefit capital interests. The
dissertation conceptually develops and illustrates a new theory of flexible rescaling which builds
on the prior work of Smith and Harvey and attempts to elucidate the under conceptualized role of
the state. Through flexible rescaling the state can be seen actively engaged in the redistribution
of internal power within the confines of an already established but inherently flexible fixed
network of power, acting as a committee serving the interests of capital. This dissertation uses
dialectics as its methodology, both to develop the conceptual framework and to illustrate the
state’s use of it in a more concrete context where the state rescales power upward or downward
or rescales power laterally to facilitate spatial change while fostering consent and/or overcoming
any obstacle to spatial change. The dissertation uses examples from Appalachia of land practices
resulting in uneven development brought about by state spatial practices that benefit capital to
illustrate the theoretical development of flexible rescaling.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
"The dialectic is critical, because it helps us to become critical of what our role has been up to
now." Bertell Ollman, Dialectical Investigations, 1993, p. 19.
To date the state's spatial role in uneven development has remained somewhat
under-theorized. Geographic research to date has failed to conceptually examine the state's
spatial role in uneven development in terms of the relationship between capital accumulation
strategies and state spatial practices. Theories of scaling and rescaling are well developed.
Researchers have recognized that the state can scale and rescale, but they have failed to view that
rescaling as an active spatial practice which the state employs to affirmatively impact uneven
development to benefit capital.
This ability of the state to scale and rescale comes with an inherent flexibility
which has been built into the state system. Laws and regulations governing the operations of
states have mechanisms in place to allow rescaling through what has already been recognized as
a downward shift or devolution of power. (Smith, 2003). The corresponding ability of states to
shift power upward has not been as thoroughly explored. When we recognize the ability to shift
power and responsibility upward and downward through the scales of the state or laterally within
the state system in place and without formal restructuring, within the context of accumulation
strategies, the new concept of flexible rescaling emerges.
To fully examine and understand this concept of flexible rescaling we need to first
recognize the dependency between Harvey's two forms of capital accumulation strategies. That
is, we must recognize, as Harvey does, that without accumulation by dispossession there could
be no accumulation by expanded reproduction. It is this need to shift between forms of capital
accumulation that creates a need within the state to flexibly rescale. Power must be shifted to
1

allow the regulation and oversight necessary to coordinate the transition between forms of capital
accumulation. The first capital accumulation strategy is accumulation by expanded reproduction
and the second is accumulation by dispossession. (Harvey, 2003). By examining the connections
between Harvey's two forms of capital accumulation, we can recognize state rescaling itself as a
spatial practice. As the state purposefully shifts power to flexibly rescale, capital shifts between
forms of accumulation, thereby resulting in uneven development. The two processes are closely
intertwined: without the ability to flexibly rescale and the inherent power shifts within the state
which accompany flexible rescaling capital would be unable to transition between accumulation
by dispossession and accumulation by expanded reproduction, which transition ultimately results
in continued capital growth and expansion.
Smith and Harvey have both discussed at length the need by capital to continually
expand as well as the ways capital attempts to achieve that goal of continued expansion. (e.g.
Smith, 1992; Harvey, 2005).

They have not examined the state's role in facilitating that

expansion through rescaling. Harvey has recognized two distinct forms of capital accumulation,
but he has not fully developed how the transitions and connections between them are driven by
the state’s role in actively rescaling power. This dissertation will develop the new concept of
flexible rescaling as a state spatial practice and will provide concrete examples of the state’s
flexible rescaling with regard to land acquisitions in Appalachia. The dissertation will examine
how the state uses spatial practices to impact uneven development to benefit capital; that is, it
will examine how the state flexibly rescales.
In this more concrete context, in Appalachia, this flexible rescaling can be seen in
its simplest form when examining state sponsored or sanctioned land acquisitions. The concept
can be illustrated by examining land acquisitions in Appalachia in two time periods. First,
2

flexible rescaling can be seen during the early transition from self sufficient farming to
dependency on capital employment through industrialization when the state changed scales to
allow accumulation by dispossession to occur as a necessary precursor to accumulation by
expanded reproduction.

Second, flexible rescaling can also be seen in Appalachia though

modern eminent domain practices sanctioned by the state which have begun to take private
property for "public use" and later for “public benefit” - primarily used here to demonstrate the
concept of flexible rescaling itself at work.
The dissertation summarizes Marxist theories of the state on which the
dissertation is based and summarizes the concept of uneven development as it has been
developed to date and as it is assumed herein. Geographic research to date regarding the two
forms of capital accumulation strategies and regarding scaling and rescaling is reviewed.
Geographical theorizations to date on the state's role in uneven development are also reviewed,
summarizing the traditional views of the state and its spatial practices and reviewing work that
already establishes some link between state spatial practices and capital accumulation, including
research by Brenner, Smith, and Harvey. The dialectical method is explained to facilitate an
understanding of the how the concept of flexible rescaling was developed here. A contribution
to the geographic literature on the state's active spatial role in uneven development is made in
developing of the new concept of flexible rescaling.

Flexible rescaling will be illustrated

through two case studies involving land acquisitions in Appalachia: the early transition from
subsistence agriculture to industrialism and the later, more modern, example of how flexible
rescaling continues to be used by the state through eminent domain.

3

Chapter 2
Marxist Theories of the State
This dissertation uses a Marxist view of the state. Therefore, an examination of
Marxist theorizations of the state is helpful to an understanding of this research.

Such

theorizations are hallmarked by their treatment of the state as "the committee for managing the
affairs of capitalists." (Ollman, 1993, p. 89). As a result, Marxists never see the state as neutral.
The later examined example of eminent domain as illustrative of the conceptual development of
flexible rescaling is clearest when we recognize, as a precursor to the conceptual development,
that the state acts primarily on behalf of and manages first and foremost the interests of capital.
Marxist state theorists always see the state as acting this way: on behalf of capital's interests.
"In Marx's theory of politics, the capitalist state is conceived of as a complex
social relation of many different aspects, the main ones being political processes and institutions,
the ruling class, an objective structure of political/economic functions, and an arena for class
struggle." (Ollman, 1993, p. 89). Different theorists focus on different aspects in theorizing the
state. Ollman refers to these as "one-sided relations." (Ollman, 1993, p. 89). Generally, Lenin
and Ralph Milliband are associated with instrumental Marxism and Nicos Poulantzas is
associated with structural Marxism, although Poulantzas later refined his own theory of the state
to define the state as an arena for class struggle. Antonio Gramsci is regarded as characterizing
the state as hegemonic. Bertell Ollman is regarded as characterizing the state primarily as an
illusory community that forms from social relations.
Each one-sided interpretation of the state referred to here "brings out something
important about the capitalist state- about its appearance, structure, functioning (including
contradictory functioning), ties to the rest of capitalism, and potential for change- just as it hides
and distorts much else." (Ollman, 1993, p. 90). Each one-sided relation "represent[s] . . .
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different tendencies inside the state relation," thus magnifying Marx's focus on internal relations.
(Ollman, 1993, p. 91). Brief discussions of each of the primary state theorists whose theories are
relied upon to any extent in this dissertation, including their differences, are contained below.
However, it is important to note before proceeding that none of the Marxist theorists who will be
discussed here is responsible for an incorrect Marxist theorization of the state. Rather, their
theorizations evidence the dialectical method and are illustrative of the different abstractions of
extension, level of generality, and vantage point discussed in more detail below, when discussing
the dialectical method. Regardless of the specific theorist relied upon, capital's interests remain
at the forefront of rationale for state activity. Herein, primary reliance is made on the Marxist
state theory of Ralph Milliband to explain state action in the context of capital benefit.
2.1

Milliband's State
Ralph Milliband's seminal work on the Marxist state is "The State in Capitalist

Society." (Milliband, 1969). Milliband is regarded as an instrumentalist, or Leninist Marxist,
because he refers to the state as an "instrument" or "tool" available for use by capital to ensure
the maintenance of conditions of uneven development beneficial to capital. This view of the
state is primarily best suited to the development of the concept of flexible rescaling, because it
demonstrates and recognizes both the state's volitional actions as well as capital's reliance on the
state for those actions as a means to secure conditions of uneven development favorable to
capital.
For Milliband, the state is operated by the ruling capitalist class, the bourgeoisie,
who either directly control the means of production or who are aligned socially with those who
control the means of production. (Milliband, 1969). As a result, it makes sense that the state
acts on capital's behalf. Milliband also recognizes the simple economic power of the bourgeoisie
5

and its influence on state action. Those in power within society are in a better position to impact
state action. They are more educated, they have more resources to devote to impacting or
influencing state action, and they are operating within society on the same level as the ruling
elite within the state. These ruling class members who control the functions of the state,
therefore, typically act in the best interest of those who control the means of production, their
peers.
The formal lobby system in the United States, whereby capital interests are
allowed to pay individuals and firms with specialized knowledge about their particular industry
to attempt to influence those within the state exemplifies the connection between the state and
the bourgeoisie. The state elite and the capital elite operate in parallel frameworks within the
state and capitalist society. Their interests in that regard are aligned in a way that gives natural
inclination to the state elite to adopt the interests of the capital elite. However, Milliband also
addressed state power as requiring the legitimacy of the workers within society. (Milliband,
1969).
In terms of the requirement of legitimacy, Milliband argued that the state uses its
influence on behalf of the bourgeoisie through education, propaganda, and regulation to coopt
the working class into the system of capitalism, despite the system's actual failure to serve the
best interests of those workers. (Milliband, 1969). Milliband seems to suggest that given the
relative potential power of workers, including their shear numerosity, the political system
expected to result would be one that advantages the interests of the worker over the bourgeoisie.
Milliband recognized, however, that despite this relative potential power the resulting system
will almost always mirror the system sought by the bourgeoisie. Milliband explains this seeming
anomaly by noting that alliances of the bourgeoisie with those in power, and the economic power
6

of those members of the bourgeoisie whose interests are typically advanced, result in a political
system which ultimately is counterintuitive. He sees the system as theoretically capable of
advantaging the worker but unlikely to do so in the end. That is, regardless of the democratic
nature of a given state and regardless of the numerosity of workers, because of the power of the
bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie's interests will control. The door remains open to research into the
bourgeoisie’s control of media and propaganda in securing this legitimation and how that control
is fostered by the state as a secondary aspect of flexible rescaling.
2.2

Poulantzas' State
While Milliband and Poulantzas agree for the most part about the Marxist state,

Poulantzas is commonly regarded as a structural Marxist. Ollman notes that the "state is said to
be an instrument of the ruling economic class; but Marx also treats [the state] as a set of
objective structures that respond to the requirements of the economy."

(Ollman, 1993, p.

67)(emphasis added). Therefore, it can be said, under Ollman's recognition, that Milliband and
Poulantzas both arguably correctly articulate Marx's conception of the state. The two simply
focus on different aspects or internal relations within Marx's conceptualization of the state.
Ollman posits that "many similar, apparently contradictory positions taken in Marx's writings . . .
are due to different abstractions of vantage point. The same relation is being viewed from
different sides, or the same process from its different moments." (Ollman, 1993, p. 67-8).
To the extent that any distinction does exist, Poulantzas distinction from
Milliband arises from his position that, instead of the state being an instrument of control and
domination over workers used by the bourgeoisie, Poulantzas believes that the state is actually
socially formed by the bourgeoisie. (Poulantzas, 2001). His Marxist state theory is premised on
integration of the state with bourgeoisie society. He sees the bourgeoisie as integral to the state
7

and as a part of the state rather than as controlling or using the state. For Poulantzas, at least in
his early writings, a non-capitalist state could not exist within a capitalist economic system. His
theory deprives workers of the ability to control the system with its current incarnation by
meshing the bourgeoisie with the state in such a way as to make it impossible for workers to
even garner any influence over the state.

To impact the system workers would have to

restructure the system itself to be a non-capitalist state. As a result, Milliband's state theory
better encompasses the conceptual development of flexible rescaling. Milliband's theory could
allow power at times to be seated with the worker, instead of at all times being seated within the
state.
Anyone who rises to power in the state as Poulantzas sees it will assume the cloak
of the bourgeoisie. The state theory Poulantzas adopts relies on the appearance of "relative
autonomy," whereby workers are not perceived to be directly controlled by those who retain the
means or production, but, rather, the perception of workers is that the state is autonomousseparate and apart from the bourgeoisie, when in fact it is not. (Poulantzas, 2001). Whereas,
Milliband's conceptualization of the state as an instrument of capital would allow workers to
assume power within the state and, at least theoretically, change the nature of the state within a
capitalist society, Poulantzas would require revolution to achieve this goal as the working class
would have to both assume power and achieve the political and economic backing within society
that might allow a working class agenda to be followed.
The differences articulated between Milliband and Poulantzas touched off a
heated debate, largely based on the relative autonomy each granted or denied to the state.
Ollman, however, notes that:
The widespread debate among Marxists over the relative autonomy
of the state usually goes on at cross purposes because the people
8

involved do not sufficiently distinguish between these different
Marxist interpretations of the state, and hence whether (under
certain circumstances) the state is relatively autonomous from the
ruling or capitalist class, or from economic requirements of
capitalism, or from other alienated social relations, etc. As a
matter of fact, there is a case to be made for relative autonomy
within each of these perspectives on the state. What is important is
to avoid the confusion that results from thinking there is only one
debate when there are really several.
(Ollman, 1993, p. 92). Milliband viewed the state from the vantage point of the ruling economic
class. Poulantzas viewed that same state from the vantage point of the socio-economic structure
that encases political function. "As a result, Milliband is better able to account for the traditional
role of the state in serving ruling class interests." (Ollman, 1993, p. 78). "Poulantzas has an
easier time explaining the relative autonomy of the state, and why the capitalist state continues to
serve the ruling class when the latter is not directly in control of state institutions.” (Ollman,
1993, p. 78).
Later, Poulantzas altered his theorization of the state (by altering his abstractions)
to reflect the state as an arena for class action. (Poulantzas, 2001). Poulantzas relied heavily on
Gramsci in formulating his later Marxist state, but Gramsci differed in ways that seem to seat
him closer to Milliband with regard to state theorizations.
2.3

Gramsci's Contribution
Unlike Poulantzas or Milliband, Gramsci never developed a comprehensive

theory of the state, but he made significant contributions to Marxist theorizations of the state
which are relevant to this dissertation, and he helped explain the absence of Marxist revolution.
Primarily, Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony, or rule by some level of consent,
thereby theoretically allowing the influences of the societal masses to impact the state if consent
was withdrawn.

(Forgacs (ed.), 2000).

This development is particularly relevant in this
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dissertation, because it explains the need for a devolution or shift in power. Gramsci's concept of
hegemony underlies the conceptual development of flexible rescaling, because it explains why
the state would need to shift power within the structure of the system. If viewed in terms of
hegemony, flexible rescaling occurs as result of a threat of withdrawn consent. The state
attempts to maintain or regain consent by shifting power to another scale- a scale at which
potential opposition would be differently structured in a way that benefitted capital or a scale at
which the composition or strength of opposition might differ in a way that made the opposition
more manageable by the state and/or capital or in a way that allowed opposition to be overcome.
Gramsci's concept of hegemony attempted to explain why Marxist revolution had
not occurred by the 20th century. Consent had prevented a revolution. (Forgacs, ed., 2000). In
the context of eminent domain, Gramsci's concept of hegemony will be used to explain why the
Kelo decision focused so heavily on "public benefit" and why the doctrines of “public use” and
“public benefit” have become cornerstones of American Eminent Domain. Briefly, for example,
and as will be explained in more detail later, the United States Supreme Court handed down a
decision commonly referred to as “Kelo” wherein capital attempted to gain consent to
accumulation by dispossession by selling public benefit to those being dispossessed.1 Kelo v.
City of New London. This form of consent gathering explains why successful eminent domain
projects have surrounded public works projects or projects couched in public works, as will be
explained in more detail later in discussing the new concept of flexible rescaling. (see generally,
(Berman v. Parker, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, and Poletown Neighborhood Council

1

Kelo v. New London is an eminent domain case that was heard by the United States Supreme Court. The town of
New London wanted to hand over its legal ability to seize private homes to a private entity, the New London
Development Corp, in order to "develop" the area for Pfizer, which had a plant in the area. One homeowner, Susette
Kelo, appealed her claim to the United States Supreme Court which ultimately ruled against her. Now Pfizer is
pulling out of the deal following its merger with Wyeth.
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v. City of Detroit).
Gramsci recognized that to achieve consent the Marxist state does not always act
entirely in the self-interest of the bourgeoisie. Rather Gramsci's state was capable of acting in
the short term interest of the working class to the detriment of the short term interest of the
bourgeoisie so long as ultimate benefit to the bourgeoisie could be maintained, thereby
preventing revolution. In the high voltage transmission line case in Appalachia, the West
Virginia Public Service Commission forced TrAIL to study an alternate route for the line which
parallels an existing high voltage transmission line. TrAIL objected stating that the alternate
route was outside the study area dictated by TrAIL and that it was an inferior route, but the State
forced the study on the route regardless, thereby acting in the short term interest of citizens.
(WV PSC Case No. 07-0508-E-CN). The alternate route was the one approved by the West
Virginia Public Service Commission, thereby obtaining some level of public consent, at least by
those who actively opposed the original route, who at that point essentially disappeared from the
TrAIL opposition. This battle over electrical lines will be more thoroughly explored later, but it
is introduced here to illustrate how Gramsci's theory of hegemony was exemplified when the
ultimate route was approved. If the original route had been approved, then TrAil and its capital
interest would have succeeded but consent would not have been obtained.

But when the

alternate route was ultimately approved, then the bourgeoisie interest in seeing the line built was
still realized, despite the state acting in the short term interest of citizenry whose land would
have been taken by the original but not the alternate route. Gramsci justified such actions based
on a recognition that state action takes place against a complex backdrop of political, economic,
and social relations. (Forgacs (ed.), 2000).
Gramsci examined generally how the state was able to subordinate the will of the
11

masses to the interests of the elite. (Forgacs (ed.), 2000).

He noted differences between

domination by exercise of force and domination by ideology or consent. (Forgacs (ed.), 2000).
These ideas form the bases of Gramsci's concept of hegemony. For Gramsci the concept of
hegemony involved at least some level of consent to being ruled, in addition to some application
of force and violence. The ruling class establishes hegemony at the point when it has gained the
consent of the class being ruled to the violence being exerted by the state. This concept of
hegemony is revisited below in discussing the TrAIL project in more detail and in the context of
the examination and development of the concept of flexible rescaling.2

2 At the time of publication of this dissertation, TrAIL was in the permitting stages in West Virginia, having been
approved in principle by the WV PSC in January of 2009.
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Chapter 3
Uneven Development and the State
In its simplest form, "uneven development" is the purposeful social and spatial
differentiation of development between persons and places.

(Smith, 1990, Ch. 4).

Such

purposeful differentiation means that both economic and social development is uneven over
space and time.

Smith links uneven development to the geographical expansion of the

contradictions of capital.

He sees both development and underdevelopment as connected

processes necessary to capitalism.

Underdevelopment is not just the failure of an area to

develop; it is actively produced. (Frank, 1967). In other words, capital is agglomerated in one
place in favour of another. (Smith, 1990). The need for continued expansion in capitalism results
in either necessary geographic expansion, with attendant development and underdevelopment, or
expansion by some other means, such as where places are redeveloped and resources are
recaptured as a means on expansion. Either way the process of capitalism reinvents itself, and
patterns of unevenness change over time as social and spatial development ebbs and flows.
Initially, some places are naturally better suited for development to occur, and, as
a result, initial development occurs faster and with greater complexity in those areas. (Smith,
1990). The logical corollary is that areas that are not as well suited for development initially lag
behind, and uneven development results. But these natural conditions that spark or suppress
development fail to explain the purposeful and extreme level of differentiation eventually
observable.
With the advent of transportation and advances in communication, the natural
obstacles of some places, namely raw materials and distance or relative isolation, largely are
overcome.

So while the principle of natural advantage adequately explains initial uneven

development, it fails to explain the continuation of uneven development or why, with
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technological advancements, underdeveloped places never manage to catch up.
The continuation of uneven development following the equalization of the playing
field by transportation and communication results from the division created by capital of the
means of production between classes. When the means of production are taken from workers,
and reside only with capitalists, uneven development results. (Smith, 1990, Ch. 4). In essence,
the capitalist process then actively creates pockets of development and underdevelopment
necessary for capital accumulation to continue. The capitalist process creates a system where
power and resources are purposefully concentrated in the hands of some while others are kept
without access to or control over that power and those resources. This system forces those
without the benefit of development to be and remain dependent on the opposing pockets of
development.
Harvey recently added to Smith's theory of uneven geographical development by
arguing for a dialectical and relational approach built upon four radically distinct recognized
conditionalities. "The four conditionalities are:
1) The material embedding of capital accumulation processes in the web of socioecological life.
2) Accumulation by dispossession (a generalization of Marx's concept of 'primitive' or
'original' accumulation under which preexisting assets are assembled as labor powers, money,
productive capacity or as commodities and put into circulation as capital).
3) The law-like character of capital accumulation in space and time.
4) Political, social, and 'class' struggles at a variety of geographical scales."
(Harvey, 2006, p. 75).
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Harvey urges stressing the internal relations between these conditionalities. He
advocates for a theory that "acknowledges the power and importance of certain processes that are
specifiable independently of each other but which can and must be brought together into a
dynamic field of interaction." (Harvey, 2006, p. 76). Essentially, here he advocates for a more
dialectical and less formulaic approach to analyzing and explaining uneven development.
Harvey retains the spatial focus of uneven development. "The very term uneven
geographical development is predicated upon some conception of what spatiality is all about."
(Harvey, 2006, p. 77). He urges us, however, to continue to view spatiality as Lefebvre and
Smith explained it, as "actively produced and as an active moment within the spatial process."
(Harvey, 2006, p. 77).
The traditional examinations of the state's role in uneven development have been
limited. These traditional examinations are dominated by three geographers (Brenner, Smith,
and Harvey) whose work is discussed below. This dissertation seeks to illustrate that the valid
connections made to date between the state and uneven development by those three geographers
remain under-theorized, however, largely because none of the three have undertaken any
significant analysis of the interconnections between active state spatial practices and capital
accumulation processes.
Before further exploring the link between active state spatial practices and capital
accumulation strategies and the resultant production of uneven development theorized by this
dissertation, it is necessary to examine the work done on state spatial practices and capital
accumulation strategies independent of one another and the existing work that links the state and
uneven development.
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3.1

Capital Accumulation Strategies
Harvey has re-identified and named two distinct, but dialectically related, forms

of capital accumulation, accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by expanded
reproduction. Both forms have their genesis, according to Harvey, in collective imperialist
practices between capitalists and the state, which practices are typically about exploiting the
uneven geographical conditions under which capital accumulation occurs which take advantage
of certain asymmetries. According to Harvey, such uneven geographic conditions arise as
wealth and power become concentrated in certain places because of asymmetrical exchange
relations. (Harvey, 2003).
Accumulation by expanded reproduction amounts to capital accumulation as we
typically see it. It is production of goods and services. Harvey defined accumulation by
dispossession as the "continuation and proliferation of accumulation practices that Marx had
treated as 'primitive' and 'original' during the rise of capitalism."

(Harvey, 2006, p. 43).

Accumulation by dispossession amounts to robbery, sanctioned and assisted by the state's
approval of the activities of capital. Harvey provides examples of this continuation of primitive
or initial accumulation:
commodification and privatization of land and the
forceful expulsion of peasant populations (as in
Mexico and India in recent times); conversion of
various forms of private property rights (common,
collective, state, etc.) into exclusive property rights;
suppression of rights to the commons;
commodification of labor power and the
suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of
production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial,
and imperialist processes of appropriation of assets
(including natural resources); monetization of
exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the
slave trade (which continues particularly in the sex
industry); and usury, the national debt, and most
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devastating of all, the use of the credit system as
radical means of primitive accumulation.
(Harvey, 2006, p. 43). Important to our analyses here, Harvey recognizes that the "state, with its
monopoly of violence and definition of legality, plays a crucial role in both backing and
promoting these processes." (Harvey, 2006, p. 43). This dissertation attempts to fill the gap left
by Harvey when he decided not to undertake an explanation of how the state plays such a crucial
role.
Harvey's explanation of accumulation by dispossession is founded upon four
essential elements.

Those elements are privatization, financialization, the management and

manipulation of crises, and state redistributions. (Harvey, 2006, pp. 44-50). Each element is
discussed in turn below.
First, privatization is defined by Harvey as the "transfer of assets from the public
and popular realms to the private and class-privileged domains." (Harvey, 2006, p. 45). Prior to
Harvey's recent statements on privatization, the definition of privatization had been restricted to
the transfer of productive public assets from the state to private companies. (Roy, 2001).
Harvey's recent expansion of the concept of privatization within the context of accumulation by
dispossession to include transfers to class-privileged domains is important to the analysis of this
dissertation and particularly relevant to the expansion of the public use doctrine and the case
study regarding eminent domain included herein.
Second, financialization, hallmarked by Harvey primarily as predatory lending
and speculative investment, is also an element of accumulation by dispossession. In initially
developing the concept of accumulation by dispossession as a spinoff of primitive accumulation
used to avert capitalist crisis, Harvey stressed the importance of finance. His definition of the
elements of accumulation by dispossession underscores that emphasis. (Harvey, 2006, p. 45).
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The third element of accumulation by dispossession, as outlined by Harvey entails
the management and manipulation of crises where there is a deliberate redistribution of wealth
that makes way for additional accumulation. Here the state enters Harvey's analysis as he notes
that "[o]ne of the prime functions of state interventions and of international institutions is to
orchestrate crises and devaluations in ways that permit accumulation by dispossession to occur
without sparking a general collapse or popular revolt." (Harvey, 2006, p. 47). Harvey does not
endeavor to reveal the state mechanism that acts behind such orchestration.
Finally, Harvey identifies state redistributions as the fourth element of
accumulation by dispossession. Here he does scratch the surface of how the state intervenes in
accumulation by dispossession noting that the state employs "redistributive policies" through
privatization schemes and reduction of state expenditures that provide social support. (Harvey,
2006, p. 48).
Harvey asserts that he chose not to expand his theory of accumulation by
dispossession to intranational situations because of the work on uneven development done by
Smith. Therefore, to link accumulation by dispossession to intranational practices, some level of
reconciliation and linkage with Smith's work on intranational uneven development will be
required.
Before exploring further the link between accumulation by dispossession and
accumulation by expanded reproduction and active state spatial practices, it is necessary to
understand the dialectical relationship between the state and capital. That relationship between
the state and capital is Harvey's "new imperialism," on which both forms of capital accumulation
depend. It is the state sponsored geographic dynamics of capital accumulation that make the
transition between accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by expanded reproduction
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possible.
This dissertation will examine that dialectical relationship between the state and
capital and how it interplays with the two forms of accumulation identified by Harvey through
active, deliberate spatial practices. Harvey notes that the institutional arrangements of the state
set the stage for capital accumulation. The state acts as a territorial framework within which the
process of capital accumulation operates.

(Harvey, 2003, p. 89).

Capital accumulation

flourishes within a system of institutional structures of law, private property, contract, and
security of money form. (Harvey, 2003, p. 89). However, how the state executes the function of
establishing and maintaining an institutional structure of law, private property, contract, and
security of money form remains under-theorized. An understanding of Harvey's accumulation
strategies is paramount.
Harvey recognizes that political power is an always unstable mix of coercions,
emulations, and, relying on Gramsci, the exercise of leadership through the development of
consent. (Harvey, 2003, p. 42). Money, productive capacity, and military might are the engines
that drive these power processes on an international scale. This dissertation will attempt to
illustrate that on an intranational scale, the engines that drive the power processes are money,
productive capacity, and regulatory power.
While Harvey leaves discussions of imperialism wed to interstate relations,
imperialist practices are equally evident within states. Confinement of such intrastate processes
to a general theory of uneven geographical development misses a quintessential opportunity to
abstract intrastate practices in terms of the two forms of capital accumulation identified by
Harvey. Also, intrastate imperialism provides a good venue for accumulation by dispossession,
because intrastate regulation is often fundamentally linked to propertied interests.
19

3.2

State Spatial Practices
An accurate and thorough understanding state spatial practices is essential to

examining the state's role in uneven development. This dissertation will focus on two aspects of
state spatial practices: Harvey's grid of spatial practices and the new concept of flexible
rescaling. Harvey's grid of spatial practices is discussed and the concept of flexible rescaling is
introduced below.
3.2.1

Harvey's Grid of Spatial Practices

In addition to analyzing the two forms of capital accumulation, Harvey also
contributed to the proposed research through his development of a grid of spatial practices. The
grid initially was used by Harvey to analyze the spatial practices of individuals, but in this
dissertation it will be used to analyze state spatial practices. As used by Harvey, the grid
examines how people's spatial practices impact their relations with space.
The grid examines how three different spatial practices work. Those three spatial
practices are experienced or material spatial practices, perceived spatial practices, and spaces of
representation or imagined spatial practices. First, experienced or material spatial practices are
physical flows and transfers across space and time. Second, perceived spatial practices are
representations of space or signs and significations that allow transfers to be understood. Third,
imagined spatial practices or spaces of representation are mental inventions of new meanings for
spatial practices. More specifically, the grid examines how these three conceptualizations of
spatial practices impact how people see and use space.
The grid looks at how people see and use space in four different ways. These four
ways space is used are accessibility and distanciation, appropriation of space, domination of
space, and production of space.

First, accessibility and distanciation is the measure of the
20

degree to which friction of space has been overcome to accommodate social interaction. Here
distance is both a barrier to and a defense against social interaction. Second, appropriation of
space is how space is taken or assumed by individuals.

Third, domination of space by

individuals or powerful groups is the legal or extra-legal means to control space.
production of space is how new systems and representations are formed. (Harvey, 1989).

Figure 1: Grid of Spatial Practices. (Source: Harvey, 1989).
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Last,

While to date the use of Harvey's grid has been specific to individual spatial
practices, examining the grid shows that it can be applied to the spatial practices of the state in
the context of uneven development.

Harvey provides explanations and examples of how

different classes of individuals construct their sense of territory and community differently in the
American city. (Harvey, 1987). This dissertation will use the grid to provide explanations and
examples for how the state uses space.
3.2.2

Flexible Rescaling

There has been significant research into rescaling. Both Smith and Brenner have
contributed to the literature regarding rescaling. Smith discussed rescaling as the ability of the
state to alter the power structure to concentrate power differently. (Smith, 2003). In Smith's
research to date, this alteration of the power structure has been confined to physical rescaling
where the structure of the state changes with the concentration of power, as happened with the
creation of the EU. (Smith, 2003). Brenner has recognized rescaling as a state spatial practice
by acknowledging that rescaling is an “active political action to facilitate, manage, mediate, and
redirect processes of geo-economic restructuring." (Brenner, 2004, p. 61). But, like Smith,
Brenner does not discuss rescaling outside the context of restructuring.
This dissertation will attempt to take the concept of rescaling beyond the
boundaries of Smith and Brenner by explaining that the spatial practices of the state can be
inherently flexible.

The concept of flexible rescaling which will be introduced in this

dissertation recognizes the ability of the state to rescale without formally restructuring. If this
view of the state is adopted, then the state can be seen as capable of mobilizing scale as a spatial
practice in order to benefit capitalism absent restructuring. The state could then respond to its
need to manage power differently without formally restructuring.
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The problem with formal restructuring is that it might dissolve the state and
recreate it, thereby creating certain political change and potential political instability. The state
tries to avoid this political instability. This dissertation will argue that the ability to flexibly
rescale is integral to the state's role in uneven development and to the avoidance of conflict. This
proposed ability of the state to rescale without restructuring is an ability built into the framework
of the state, for use to the benefit of the state and capital when needed. With flexible rescaling,
the state has the ability to change the way it regulates without changing the formal fixed scales of
government and without risking revolution.
Smith's more recent work on scale reflects a recognition of the "simultaneity of
scales."

(Smith, 2000). Smith describes that simultaneity as the interflow between bodily,

global, and intervening scales where scales are embodied and reconstructed at the same time.
Smith argues that this simultaneity of scale demonstrates the socially constructed nature of
scales. (Smith, 2000). Smith recognizes scaling (and rescaling) as the product of economic,
political, and social activities and relationships. (Smith, 2000). But, Smith never directly
recognizes the component of flexibility built into the state's regulatory framework which allows
for change without formal restructuring.
One of the overarching points which will be made in the dissertation is that the
state is flexible, and that flexibility amounts to a spatial practice of the state, the impact of which
goes largely unnoticed and unconsidered. The flexibility to devolve power between scales is
inherent. No formal restructuring is required to transfer or devolve power.
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Chapter 4
Geographic Theorizations to Date Regarding the State and Uneven Development
Certain concepts already have been developed that significantly contribute to the
current conceptualization of the state's role in uneven development. Those concepts act as the
foundation for a more complete theorization of the state's role in uneven development. This
dissertation intends to use those existing geographic theorizations regarding the state's role in
uneven development, as well as to extend beyond their boundaries to make connections not
before developed. "To begin with, . . . abstractions do not and cannot diverge completely from
the abstractions of other thinkers . . .. There has to be a lot of overlap. Otherwise, [one will]
have constructed what philosophers call a ‘private language,’ and any communication between
[one] and the rest of [the world] would be impossible." (Ollman, 1993, p. 27). Therefore, before
exploring further how the interplay between state spatial practices and capital accumulation
strategies impacts uneven development, it is first necessary to examine what geographers have
already said about the state's role in uneven development.
Many geographers have addressed the functional and institutional roles of the
state which contribute to theorizations of uneven geographic development. Only three, however,
Neil Brenner, Neil Smith, and David Harvey, attempt a theorization of how those roles play out
as the state's actual role in uneven geographic development. In fact, in addition to those three,
the non-geographer Marxist social theorists discussed above, like Milliband and Poulantzas, have
gone farther toward explaining the role of the state in uneven development than the majority of
the remaining geographers.
4.1

The Institutional and Functional Roles of the State
A discussion of those geographers who have offered explanation of the

institutional and functional roles of the state, generally, without meaningfully linking the role of
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the state to uneven geographical development, is required when examining the geographical
literature on the state's role in managing uneven development. It is required, because such a
linkage obviously follows, (Cox, 2004), regardless of the failure of those geographers to
ultimately make such a linkage.
More than two decades ago, state theory moved from an instrumentalist
conception toward a recognition of the complexity and specificity of the state and its distinctive
organizational nature as a set of apparatuses. (Blomley, 1988). Following such a recognition,
the state was no longer regarded by most merely in an instrumental fashion or simply reduced to
a functional expression of capitalist imperatives. Recognition was given by many state theorists
that the state also has the qualities of an autonomous actor. (Blomley, 1988).
Mann identified the power of the state, which arguably underlies the resultant
uneven development within the state, as twofold. (Mann, 2003). Per Mann, these two state
powers are despotic and infrastructural. Despotic powers are defined by Mann as the range of
actions the elite can take without institutional negotiations with civil society groups. These
powers are also called the "autonomy of power" of the state elsewhere in the geographic
literature. They are the "power over civil society." By contrast, infrastructural powers are
articulated by Mann as the capacity of the state to penetrate civil society and implement political
decisions. According to Mann these are the more common and concerning powers like the
powers to tax income and wealth, to collect information on the citizenry, to enforce rules and
regulations instituted by the state, to regulate the economy, and to directly provide for the
subsistence of at least some citizens (Mann argues most) in the form of state employment,
pensions, and family allowances. (Mann, 2003). This power is the power of the state to
penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society
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According to Mann, infrastructural power is strong in relation to individuals and
weak in relation to groups. Examples of infrastructural power development given by Mann
(without any explanation of how those powers are developed) are the central division of labor
between entities centrally coordinated, the storage power over information and the ability to
codify laws, the control of coinage and weights and measures and the guarantee of value, and the
provision of rapid communication and transportation, what Harvey would term structured
coherence, to society.

(Mann, 2003).

However, Mann's attempts to reduce the possible

incarnation of the state to four ideal types fails, particularly where imperial states are defined by
Mann as possessing high despotic and low infrastructural powers. Such a restriction of power in
imperial states seemingly is an incorrect denial of significant infrastructural power to imperial
states.
Mann identifies the primary functions of the state as all falling under the umbrella
of rulemaking. They are the persistent actions of maintaining order, namely protecting the
propertied classes from the propertyless, military defense in the form of collective action or
military aggression in the form of action to the benefit of specific interests, the provision of what
Harvey would call structured coherence, and economic redistribution, including international
redistribution through market regulation. Mann suggests that the power to undertake these
functions arises primarily from the territorial centrality of the state. (Mann, 2003). Mann is not
the only scholar to discuss the state’s actions in detail, however.
Silvern discusses state regulation in his analysis of American Indian Treaty rights
juxtaposed against the doctrines of state centrism and equal footing.

(Silvern, 2002).

In

examining these rights and this regulation, Silvern exposes, consistent with Delaney's analysis,
that despite the Supreme Court saying that both states and the federal government may regulate
26

use of state space, even in the face of treaties arguably silent on the issue, "to the present time
there never has been either legal analysis or citation of a non-dictum [or non-binding] authority
in any decision of the Supreme Court of the Land in support of its decisions holding that state
police power may be employed to limit or modify the exercise of rights." (Silvern, 2002, p. 51).
The state furthers and maintains an impression of its own position both as a
legitimate and as an autonomous actor within the space-economy and, secondary to this, as an
efficacious social agent. (Blomley, 1988). Delaney argues that the legal system is used to these
ends, to "enlist the power of the state to validate some versions in preference to other competing
versions." (Delaney, 2001, p. 490). By this description of law, we understand law to be one tool
(if not the primary tool) employed by the state to manage uneven development, regardless of
scale.
Given the state's requirement of legitimacy, however, the state must "function and
appear as an impartial arena, as a site of justice, it must also serve to constrain the power and
ambitions of national and subnational governments, and thus can serve to recognize and even
protect" marginalized groups in order to retain requisite legitimacy. (Silvern, 2002, p. 35). Law,
therefore, becomes a site of domination and resistance, colonization and decolonization, (Silvern,
2002, p. 35) . . . a site for uneven development. Despite these recognitions of the legitimation
required to maintain the state's power and the general role of the law in securing legitimation,
how the law mediates to provide such legitimation to the state, as a system, has never been
theorized. Instead, scholars to date have recognized that law provides requisite legitimation, but
they have never undertaken to discuss how, except for the basic recognition that legitimation
results from the appearance of justice created by the law.
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4.2

Brenner, Smith, and Harvey on the State and Uneven Development
In critically discussing the state's role in managing uneven development, it is

instructive to examine the state's role in two regards: first, with regard to the state's role in
managing classic uneven regional development as theorized by Neil Brenner and Neil Smith, and
to some extent by Harvey, and, second, with regard to the state's role in managing accumulation
strategies. While Harvey has restricted his analysis of accumulation strategies and accumulation
by dispossession to international imperialism, his analysis of capital accumulation strategies can
be expanded to intranational imperialism where the state's role has yet to be sufficiently
theorized.
Brenner, Smith, and Harvey all have made significant contributions to the
geographic literature by taking us beyond the traditional institutional and functional roles of the
state to examine some aspects of the linkages between the state and uneven development.
Briefly stated, Brenner posits that the state's role in uneven development is twofold: first, the
state acts as a form of territorialization for capital and, second, the state acts as an institutional
mediator of uneven geographical development on differential, overlapping spatial scales.
(Brenner, 1998). Finding scale to be absolutely central to the processes and politics of uneven
geographical development, Smith generally posits that the state's role in uneven development is
to form the territorial container for social action, thus defining territorial scale and creating a
foundation where uneven geographical development can occur. (Smith, 1990). Both of these
geographers obviously build primarily on the Marxist state theories of Poulantzas, Milliband, and
Gramsci. Lastly, Harvey generally defines the state as a power arising from, but placed above,
society to moderate conflict between the classes which becomes the locus of power by which
class domination through law, taxation, and coercion can occur. (Harvey, 1978). From this
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definition he develops the state's role in varying forms of capital accumulation resulting in
uneven development as the role to hold a monopoly of violence and a definitional power over
legality, thereby playing a crucial role in backing and promoting the processes of accumulation.
(Harvey, 2003).
4.2.1

Brenner on the State's Role in Uneven Development

Brenner's earlier work connects the state's spatial attributes of "spatial tactics" and
"spatial targets" to uneven development by noting that the state tolerates and even encourages
uneven development as cities and regions participate in competition over capital development
and accumulation strategies (Brenner, 1997a). Brenner has written at length regarding the
spatiality of the state, with questionable success. However, only Brenner's earlier connections to
uneven development are addressed herein. This dissertation seeks to further Brenner's earlier
work and to correct his later misadventures into state spatiality.
Brenner sees the key roles of the state as acting as a form of territorialization for
capital and acting as an institutional mediator of uneven geographical development on
differential, overlapping spatial scales. (Brenner, 1998).

For Brenner forms of territorialization

of capital are always scaled. These scales circumscribe the social relations of capital within
determinate, but highly contested, geographical boundaries and "hierarchize" them (the social
relations) within relatively structured, although uneven and asymmetrical, patterns of
sociospatial interdependence. (Brenner, 1998). Loosely theorized, state scaling contributes to
uneven geographical development. Brenner develops this theory by relying on and extending
LeFebvre. According to Brenner (1997b), who argues that the state scales to manage uneven
development,
[t]erritorial states are confronted with new regulatory problems as
their 'internal' spaces are continuously remolded through new
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patterns of industrialization, urbanization, regional development,
underdevelopment, and socio-spatial polarization of different
geographical scales. To regulate these new mosaics of socially
produced geographical unevenness, the territorial state deploys a
wide range of geographically specific policies oriented toward
different cities, industrial districts, regions, growth poles,
peripheries, 'underdeveloped' zones, rural areas, and so forth. In
each case, Lefebvre argues, the state strives to construct 'a
hierarchical ensemble of places, functions and institutions,' a task
that at once entails biological reproduction, the reproduction of the
labor force, the reproduction of the means of production, and the
reproduction of the social relations of production and domination.
Brenner notes that LeFebvre argues that the state mode of production must be
understood as both a form of territorialization for capital and also as the most important
institutional mediator of capital's uneven geographical development on multiple intertwined
scales, a traditionally Marxist view of the state.

(Brenner, 1998).

The state’s delicate

equilibrium for capital is then primarily based on the state’s ability to command and control scale
within its territorial space. (Brenner, 1998). Brenner identifies that the state uses space or scale
as its privileged instrument to impact the relations between individuals, groups, class fractions,
and classes. (Brenner, 1998). But how these scales are managed remains a mystery in Brenner's
writings. What we do know from Brenner is that "[t]he contours of this uneven geography are
not inscribed permanently onto the institutional landscapes of capitalism, but are reworked
continually through capital's restless development dynamic and through successive political
strategies to subject it to some measure of regulatory control," arguably an allusion to flexibility,
although it remains more likely that Brenner was referring to a more classical restructuring when
he referenced such a "reworking." (Brenner, 2004, p. 13-14).
Brenner acknowledges that uneven geographical development is, therefore,
associated with new profit-making opportunities for capital and also with potentially
destabilizing, disruptive effects that erode the socio-territorial preconditions for sustainable
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capital accumulation. (Brenner, 2004). Capitalist expansion and development can be dangerous
even for capitalism because of its uneven formulations.

While capitalist strategies of

deterritorialization can succeed in circumventing some constraints imposed by national
boundaries, they do not translate into true hyper mobility and placelessness and therefore are
unsuccessful at alleviating the perils of uneven geographical development. (Brenner, 2004, p.
59).
4.2.2 Smith on the State's Role in Uneven Development
Smith has long focused on scale and uneven geographical development, linking
the two through the state. He notes that "the demarcation of scale should be seen as absolutely
central to the processes and politics of uneven geographical development." (Smith, 2003).
Because the state forms the territorial container for social action, thus defining territorial scale, it
creates a foundation where uneven geographical development can occur. When scalar divisions
within the state are manifested, uneven geographical development is manifested. (Smith, 2003).
In his seminal text, Uneven Development, Smith explained the artificial, social
construction of nature.

While Smith's book falls short of conceptualizing how the state

accomplishes this construction, he makes the fact that the state has a role in such construction
clear. (Smith, 1990). A decade later, legal geographer David Delaney developed a hypothesis
that the state's social construction of nature occurred by force of law. (Delaney, 2001). Delaney
also notes that law is enforced by the organized violence of the centralized state, thereby
extended Mann's theorization that territorial centrality of the state underlies state power, (Mann,
2003), and expounding slightly on Smith's linkage of the state and uneven development.
(Delaney, 2001).
Smith does dismiss any argument of randomness of geographic unevenness.
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(Smith, 1990). Smith argues, instead, that uneven geographic development is the result of
tensions created by the drive of capitalism to continually accumulate. More specifically, Smith
identifies a tension between the tendency of capitalists to attempt to equalize investment across
space (the tendency to replicate positive accumulation strategies) and the need for capitalists to
diversify and expand at uneven and unpredictable paces (the result of competition and attempted
differentiation between capitalists), resulting in an exploitation of space to allow for
accumulation. (Smith, 1990). Capitalists attempt to seek out territorially unique advantages, and
attempts at technological innovation also result in uneven geographic patterns. (Smith, 1990).
The functions of the state, according to Smith, with regard to controlling and
managing uneven development, are twofold. The state arbitrates in favor of the ruling class, and
the state divides people for public purposes by their common place of residence. (Smith, 1990).
This division creates nationalism and localism. As a result, the state plays a crucial part in
identity formation. (Smith, 1990). This observation by Smith allows us to meaningfully link
issues of identity, both internal and external, to the state's actions.

Appalachian identity

formation illustrates this concept, with the state sponsored Appalachian Regional Commission
continuing to form and impact Appalachian identity through its actions and initiatives.
Because Smith sees space as a commodity, the state's role in establishing
territoriality is fundamental to the commodification of space. Smith opines that spatial properties
are part of the use value of a commodity. If we see them as such, then each time the state
impacts spatiality it impacts commodity value. Similarly, the spatial integration that takes place
is fostered by the state. Capitalism's need to link commodities production through exchange is
obviously heavily state regulated. The resultant progressive integration and transformation of
absolute spaces into relative space identified by Smith is then managed by the state. The point of
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departure here is to explain how and why the state accomplishes these goals.
Smith's conception of the principle of natural advantage (discussed previously)
may also be impacted directly by state action. Economic development initiatives and state
financing impact the potential for uneven development and the potential to transcend it, thus
underscoring the importance that would later be placed by Harvey on finance.
As stated, Smith recognizes that three primary state scales emerge. For him the
scales are not fixed; they continue to be shaped by capitalist development. But the internal
differentiation between the scales is fixed according to Smith.

Once again, the scales he

identifies are urban, nation-state, and global. Urban space is used as an absolute space of
production. Production is centralized here and determines urban development. Smith postulates
that urban space should be viewed as the expansion of the geographic sphere of "abstract labor."
Labor first expands within urban space and eventually beyond it and then internally
differentiates. (Smith, 1990). The nation-state scale is politically determined by a series of
historical deals, compromises, and wars by or on behalf of the state. (Smith, 1990). Capitalism
is then forced to act within or move beyond the confines of this state established scale. Smith
notes that the nation-state scale is rigid and not capable of fluid expansion.

It has both

centralization and differentiation on a regional level which leads to rising and declining regions.
The regions are the product of a differentiated nation state. The global scale is defined by Smith
as the world market. (Smith, 1990). It universalizes wage labor and attempts to equalize. Its
definition is also political, despite its lack of a unified state body. It is responsible for the
production of class relations. Capital attempts to convert these spaces into places of production
and accumulation as well as a location for consumption, but frequently, according to Smith,
capital is unable to do so because of the inherent difficulties in attempting to make global spaces
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places of consumption while maintaining the underdevelopment that results in accumulation on a
grand scale. At all three scales the state impacts uneven development and capitalism because of
its roles in defining and redefining spatial and scalar state properties.
4.2.3 Harvey on the State's Role in Accumulation Strategies and Uneven
Development
Before the New Imperialism (Harvey, 2003) was written, and contemporaneous
with the proliferation of state theory, Harvey analyzed the Marxian theory of the state. This
analysis appears to be Harvey's first implicit connection between the state and uneven
geographical development. Harvey defined the Marxian state as a power arising from, but
placed above, society to moderate conflict between the classes which becomes the locus of
power by which class domination through law, taxation, and coercion can occur. (Harvey,
1978). Such class domination is the heart of uneven geographic development, and the power of
the state articulated by Harvey to do so links the two.
In the 1980's Harvey expanded on Marx's identification of the propensity of
global capitalism to attempt to "annihilate space by time."

Harvey further theorized the

contemporaneous orientation of capital to geographically expand and temporally accelerate.
(Harvey, 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1989; recognized by Brenner, 2004). Harvey premised the
ability to overcome space on the ability of capital to produce space, a process in which the state
becomes intimately involved. (Harvey, 1985). Based on these assumptions, Harvey identifies
the "spatial fix" and, even prior to Brenner, recognizes the propensity of capital to attempt
continual restructuring as a result. (Harvey, 1985).
Harvey had earlier recognized the still persistent need for the state to appear
independent and autonomous by defining an "illusory common interest" to foster consent,
(Harvey, 1978) a theory more fully developed later by the New Imperialism. The key function
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of the state, in this regard, is to organize and guarantee certain benefits for labor which are not
immediately beneficial to capital, but which ultimately will allow capital to further subordinate
and dominate. Such benefits are guaranteed in exchange for allegiance by the subordinate
classes. Harvey opines that international imperialism can be used to guarantee these benefits
while gaining intranational allegiance.

(Harvey, 1978).

While he never postulates that

intranational imperial practices may also be used to gain allegiance, such a theoretical extension
is logical.
Harvey identified four basic functions which must be fulfilled by the state to
support a capitalist system: creation of juridical individuals, creation and maintenance of a
system of private property rights, determination of standard value, and creation of reciprocal
dependence in exchange. He postulated that the performance of these functions would help to
control the conflict between capital and labor, (Harvey, 1978) thereby allowing uneven
development to persist.
Later, in the New Imperialism, in discussing the state's role in accumulation by
dispossession, Harvey notes that the state, which holds a monopoly of violence and holds
definitional power over legality, plays a crucial role in backing and promoting the processes of
accumulation of dispossession. This role of the state is evident both as those processes are
articulated by Marx to be the primitive accumulation processes of:
the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful
expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of various forms
of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive
private property rights; the suppression of rights to the commons;
the commodification of labor power and the suppression of
alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption;
colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of
assets (including natural resources); the monetization of exchange
and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade; and usury, the
national debt, and ultimately the credit system. . .
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and as those processes are articulated additionally by Harvey. (Harvey, 2003, p. 145). Harvey
contends that Marx's sketch of processes of primitive accumulation remains viable, but he finds
the processes of manipulating the credit system and finance capital to play an even larger role in
the continuing process of accumulation by dispossession than in the process of original primitive
accumulation. Harvey identifies new processes as well, such as the commodification of cultural
forms, histories, and intellectual creativities as well as usurpation of intellectual property rights
and biopiracy. (Harvey, 2003). In addition, the creation of private property rights and use of
state power to create and enforce those rights also can account for accumulation by
dispossession.
The reason state intervention is so important in the process of accumulation by
dispossession is that the state's assistance is required to orchestrate a devaluation of assets or
labor in such a way as to permit accumulation by dispossession to occur while preventing a
general economic collapse from happening. The state is also needed to create the essential link
between accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by expanded reproduction. The state
coordinates both processes to the benefit of the same capital powers.
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Chapter 5
Ollman’s Dialectical Method
The dialectical method will be used in this dissertation to make the essential
connections between state spatial practices and capital accumulation which hopefully will
illuminate the state's role in uneven development. The dialectical method places emphasis on
process, internal relations, and contradictions. The method approaches systems as if those
systems are in a constant state of change and flux. Problems with how we have historically
studied the world are compounded by an approach that privileges whatever makes things appear
static and independent over their more dynamic and systemic qualities. (Ollman, 1993, p. 10).
In this regard, state space has been privileged over state spatial practices. The dialectical method
restructures our thinking about reality by replacing our common sense notions of things as
having a history and external connections with other things with the concepts of process and
relation, the focus being on internal relations. (Ollman, 1993, p. 10). "Dialectics avoids the
more mechanistic and reductionist versions of this problem and permits the issue to be
approached theoretically in an open and fluid way." (Harvey, 2006, p. 76). The method has a
relational ontology. (Merrifield, 1993).
In its essential form, the dialectical method involves employing a process called
abstraction to move beyond appearances and understand the important relationships and
connections between things. "Dialectics, and in particular that version of it which stresses
internal relations, is perpetually negotiating the relation between the particular and the universal,
between the abstract and the concrete." (Harvey, 2006, p. 76).
"[D]ialectical research begins with the whole, the system, or as much of it as one
understands, and then proceeds to an examination of the part to see where it fits and how it
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functions, leading to a fuller understanding of the whole from which one has begun." (Ollman,
1993, p. 12). This method starts with the real concrete, defined as the world as it presents itself
to us, and proceeds through abstraction or the intellectual activity of breaking the whole down
into manageable mental units we can use to think about and understand the whole, through the
thought concrete, which Marx defines as the reconstituted whole which then can be understood
as a new whole. Every piece gets pulled from the whole, examined, and temporarily perceived
as standing apart. (Ollman, 1993, p. 24).
Ollman provides a clear and useful example for understanding the process of
abstraction. He notes:
In listening to a concert, for example, we often concentrate on a
single instrument or recurring theme and then redirect our attention
elsewhere. Each time this occurs, the whole music alters, new
patterns emerge, each sound takes on a different value, etc. How
we understand the music is largely determined by how we abstract
it.
(Ollman, 1993, p. 25).
Dialectical research traces four types of relations. Dialectical research also uses
three modes of abstraction to examine the elements of a given whole. Both the relations and the
process of abstraction require further explanation.
5.1

Four Dialectical Relations
A dialectical relation is essentially a way of examining how some element of the

whole relates to the whole or to other elements of the whole. The dialectical method identifies
four different dialectical relations. (Ollman, 1993, p. 13). Those four dialectical relations are:
1.

Identity/difference;

2.

Interpenetration of opposites;

3.

Quantity/quality; and
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4.

Contradiction.

Each dialectical relation is explained briefly in succession below.
5.1.1

Identity/Difference

The first dialectical relation, identity/difference, is what Ollman terms the
"perspectival element." (Ollman, 1993, p. 14). It recognizes that things appear differently
depending on the perspective of the viewer. The identity of something is different depending on
who sees it. In this respect, Ollman notes that Marx privileged the perspective of the worker.
(Ollman, 1993, p. 14). Identity is essential to the forthcoming discussion of the extension aspect
of abstraction. In embodies the sameness and difference of parts being analyzed, often with at
least some portion of that sameness and difference existing simultaneously.
When "viewing parts as necessary aspects of each other, they become identical in
expressing the same extended whole." We must first view abstracted parts as identical even
before they have been abstracted from the whole. Examining them as identical aspects before
they are abstracted from the whole ensures their unity. "Identity precedes difference." (Ollman,
1993, p. 43). Differences, though, when ultimately found do not destroy the identical nature of
the parts. They do not create a problematic contradiction, they only allow us to better understand
the true nature of the whole from which they have been abstracted. "Hence, the coexistence of
identity and difference." (Ollman, 1993, p. 43).
5.1.2. Interpenetration of Opposites
The second dialectical relation, the interpenetration of opposites, refers to the
situation of things in place and time. The relation recognizes that "nothing- no event, institution,
person, or process- is simply and solely what it seems to be at a particular place and time."
(Ollman, 1993, p. 14). Rather, if viewed under different conditions, the same thing may appear
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or actually be different than it seemed. This relation urges us to examine where and how change
has already occurred and under what still-developing conditions new changes are likely to occur
as a means of both gauging the complexity of the part [here the conceptual element of the state]
and of determining its dependence on the evolution of the system.
5.1.3. Quantity/Quality
The third dialectical relation, quantity/quality, refers to change over time. This
relation brings into single focus the before and after aspects of development.

"Initially,

movement within any process takes the form of quantitative change. One or more of its aspects .
. . increases or decreases in size or number.

Then, at a certain point . . . a qualitative

transformation takes place indicated by a change in its appearance or function." (Ollman, 1993,
p. 15). Ollman notes that at this point of transformation in both quantity and quality what you
are examining "has become something else while, in terms of its main constituting relationships,
remaining essentially the same." (Ollman, 1993, p. 15).
Quantity/quality are important to the examination of both capital accumulation
strategies and flexible rescaling. Quantity/quality is a historical movement whereby one or more
aspects of what something is change in quantity. The aspects get larger or smaller and increase
or decrease in number until the aspect attains "critical mass" and a qualitative transformation
occurs. (Ollman, 1993, p. 49). In essence, once one aspect of a process or relation gets big
enough or small enough, it changes the appearance and composition of the process or relation
from which it was abstracted, and a qualitative change in what the process or relation is can be
seen.
5.1.4. Contradiction
The fourth, and final, dialectical relation, contradiction, is the most important of
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the four relations. Contradiction can be understood as the incompatible development of different
component parts which are at the same time dependent on one another. Ollman notes that
dialectics "attribute[s] the main responsibility for all change to the inner contradictions of the
system or systems in which [change] occurs." (Ollman, 1993, p. 17). Contradiction, then,
focuses research on the internal contradictions within a given process, and dialectics focuses on
internal relations. Contradiction includes both elements of historical movement and elements of
organic movement. (Ollman, 1993, p. 50).
Contradiction encompasses five different "movements." Those five movements
are mutual support, mutual undermining, eminent unfolding, change in overall form through
interaction, and resolution. (Ollman, 1993, p. 51-52). Ollman contends that the first two
movements are the most important, because each places a constant pulling in the opposite
direction. "The uneasy equilibrium that results lasts until one or the other of these movements
predominates." (Ollman, 1993, p. 51). These two movements are at the heart of both the
transition between capital accumulation strategies and flexible rescaling.
The third movement, eminent unfolding, reflects a sharpening or intensifying of
the first two movements, not necessarily to the same degree. The growth of the system as a
whole leads to the growth of these contradictions as well. The contradictions become more
obvious and stark as they growth within the system, and they become the elements most
observable at this point in the movements.
The fourth movement results from the powerful growth of the third. This fourth
movement is when change in the overall form occurs as the first two movements play themselves
out. Ollman notes this movement can occur when the systemic interactions are the same but the
entire contradiction gets metamorphosized. The fifth and final movement then occurs "in its
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resolution when one side overwhelms what has hitherto been holding in check, transforming both
itself and all its relationships in the process." (Ollman, 1993, p. 52).
Ollman labels the way dialectics deals with change as the "double movement
(organic and historical) of the capitalist mode of production." Recall that quantity and quality
was referred to above as an historical movement, and contradiction was referred to above as
having elements of both organic and historical movements. Ollman breaks that organic and
historical double movement down into a number of sub-movements, some of which are
synonymous with the four dialectical relations discussed above. His sub-movements include
quantity/quality (discussed above), metamorphosis, and contradiction (discussed above), which
he contends are the three most important, plus mediation, interpenetration of opposites (also
discussed above), negation of negation, precondition and result, and unity and separation.
(Ollman, 1993, p. 48).
Because Ollman contends that metamorphosis is one of the most important submovements of the double movement, it is important to understand that sub-movement as well.
Metamorphosis examines organic movements of interaction within a system "in which qualities
(occasionally appearances, but usually functions) of one part get transferred to other parts so that
the latter can be referred to as forms of the former." (Ollman, 1993, p. 49). In metamorphosis,
"a process is abstracted that is large enough to include both what is changing and what it is
changing into," thereby implicating the process of abstraction of extension. (Ollman, 1993, p.
49).
In this dissertation, both capital accumulation strategies and state spatial practices
each will be analyzed in terms of the dialectical relations, movements, and submovements
identified and discussed above. This analysis will be performed through use of the modes of
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abstraction explained below as a means of better theorizing the state's role in uneven
development and making connections between state spatial practices and uneven development.
While these analyses will be perceptible, so as to avoid too positivist of a presentation, their
inclusion will not be explicit.
5.2

Three Modes of Abstraction
A mode of abstraction is actually how you go about examining a particular

concept. It differs from a dialectical relation in that instead of being the way a component part
relates to others or the whole, a mode of abstraction involves how we figure out the way
component parts relate to one another or the whole. Ollman notes that the process of abstraction
actually comprises these three "modes of abstraction" or "aspects of abstraction." Those modes
or aspects are:
1.

Extension;

2.

Level of generality; and

3.

Vantage point.

(Ollman, 1993). Each mode of abstraction is explained in succession following a discussion of
the process of abstraction generally.
In the process of abstraction Marx allows the researcher to break down the whole
into mental units with which we think about it as a means of reconstituting that whole in a way
that can be understood. (Ollman, 1993, 24). "In one sense, the role Marx gives to abstraction is
simple recognition . . . that all thinking about reality begins by breaking it down into manageable
parts." (Ollman, 1993, p. 24). Through abstraction "a piece [is] pulled from or taken out of the
whole and is temporarily perceived as standing apart." (Ollman, 1993, p. 24). "In 'abstraction'
we have simply separated out, focused, and put emphasis on certain common features of these
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other processes." (Ollman, 1993, p. 25-6). Therefore, this dissertation separates the concepts of
capital accumulation strategies and state spatial practices out from the concept of uneven
development. This separation is being made, because it is thought that dialectical examination
and the resulting understanding of capital accumulation strategies and state spatial practices will
allow what Ollman identified here as their "certain common features," to foster a new
understanding of the state's role in uneven development.
5.2.1. Extension
The first mode of abstraction, extension, deals with the spatial and temporal
framework placed around the part abstracted.

(Ollman, 1993, p. 39).

While abstracting

boundaries and limits in time, extension, like abstraction generally takes us from the concrete
whole into abstracted parts and back to a mental recreation of the whole. It breaks the whole into
pieces and then puts the pieces back together again. In doing so, abstraction of extension focuses
on the qualities of identity and difference.
In this dissertation extension has already been employed to parse out two
conceptual elements for study. Once such an abstraction is made, Ollman reminds us that Marx
terms the abstracted elements "form," which Ollman notes is "Marx's chief way of telling us that
he has found an identity in difference. [Things are at the same time different and part of the same
whole.]" (Ollman, 1993, p. 43). In this dissertation an identity in difference has been found
between state spatial practices and capital accumulation strategies, such that each can be treated
as a form, both separately (recognizing their differences from one another) and wholly
(recognizing that they are constituent parts of the uneven development of the state at the same
time).
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5.2.2. Level of Generality
The second mode of abstraction, level of generality, refers to the process of
extracting the general and specific characteristics from parts of the whole. Then the similarities
and differences between specific and general characteristics are noted. Level of generality "is a
move from a more specific understanding . . . that brings into focus the whole network of equally
specific qualities in which it functions to a more general understanding . . . that brings into focus
the equally general state of those conditions in which it occurs." (Ollman, 1993, p. 54).
Marx subdivides the world into seven major levels of generality. Marx organizes
everything according to one of these seven levels. The levels are what is:
1. Unique to a person and situation;
2. General to a person and situation;
3. Capitalist;
4. Class Society;
5. Human Society;
6. The animal world; and
7. Qualities as a material part of nature.
Level one, what is unique to a person and situation is exemplified by proper
names and addresses. Here whatever makes someone unique is brought into focus for as long as
it lasts as a unique quality, then the transformation to level two, where generalities begin, takes
place. At level two, abstracted into focus are the qualities that make us speak of an individual or
situation in terms of classes, for Marx "as an engineer or in terms of some other occupation that
has emerged in modern capitalism." (Ollman, 1993, p. 55). Bringing these more general
qualities into focus then focuses us on what is at its most basic common among the individuals or
45

situations examined at level one.
Level three is confined to capitalism. "[E]verything that is peculiar to people,
their activity, and products due to their appearance and functioning in capitalist society is
brought into focus." (Ollman, 1993, p. 55). This level allows Marx to look at typical works and
beyond individuals and occupations. Level three broadens not only characteristics but time. It
includes everyone that has taken part in the capitalist system over the history of capitalism. Of
course debate remains as to when a capitalist system emerged. (See Generally, Dunaway, 1996).
Levels four, five, and six continue to progress through the levels of generality of
class society, human society, and the animal world.

They occur as the middle of Marx's

continuum from specific to general. Level four focuses on the period of history where society
can still be divided into classes based on their division of labor. Level five brings into focus
qualities of people that result from the human condition as a common denominator. Level six
broadens the generality even further to remove society from the equation, replacing it with a
focus on the characteristics of "life functions, instincts, and energies" that are not common to just
the human population, but which extend outward into the living world more generally. (Ollman,
1993, p. 56). Level seven is the most general of the levels of extension which focuses on even
more general characteristics of being such as weight and extension.
[E]ach level, beginning with seven, establishes a range of possibilities for what
can occur on the more specific levels that follow." (Ollman, 1993, p. 65). The significance of
level of generality is found in the realization that "all the problems from which we suffer and
everything that goes into solving them or keeping them from being solved is made up of qualities
that can only be brought into focus on one or another of these different levels of generality."
(Ollman, 1993, pp. 56-7). Therefore, "it is essential, in order to understand any particular
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problem, to abstract a level of generality that brings the characteristics chiefly responsible for
this problem into focus."

(Ollman, 1993, p. 57).

We need to look at different levels of

specificity to make valid determinations about anything we are examining. We must place any
relation we intend to examine at the proper level of generality for its examination to be accurate,
but there are movements that can be found or recognized regardless of the level of generality
chosen. These movements are referred to as "laws of the dialectic." Three of the four laws of
the dialectic have already been discussed: interpenetration of opposites, quantity/quality, and
contradiction.
The fourth law of the dialectic is negation of negation. Negation of negation is
also one of the dialectical movements within the historical and organic double movement Ollman
identifies. (Ollman, 1993, p. 48). Negation of negation has not yet been discussed. It occurs
when "the most recent phase in a development that has gone through at least three phases will
display important similarities with what existed in the phase before last." (Ollman, 1993, p. 64).
"[T]he laws of the dialectic do not in themselves explain, or prove, or predict anything, or cause
anything to happen. Rather, they are ways of organizing the most common forms of change and
interaction that exist on any level of generality for purposes of study and intervention into the
world of which they are part." (Ollman, 1993, p. 65).
Consistent with Ollman's directives with regard to level of generality, geographers
Cox and Mair have recognized that, "[d]iscarding more abstract concepts seems [] to be at least
as dangerous as any tendency to work at too high a level of abstraction." (Cox and Mair, 1989, p.
125). While they have stated their preference to construct a network of concepts that refers to
various aspects of the local, their urgings are relevant at any scale and are relevant to the level of
generality mode of abstraction as a whole. (Cox and Mair, 1989).
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While they noted the

significance of conceptualizing locality in terms of hierarchical levels of abstraction, the same
strategy can be employed regardless of scale. This strategy is integral to, if not synonymous
with, the level of generality mode of abstraction.
5.2.3. Vantage Point
The third mode of abstraction, vantage point, is essentially the "place from which
to view the elements of any particular relation and, given its then extension, from which to
reconstruct the larger system of which this relation belongs." (Ollman, 1993, p. 68). Vantage
point recognizes that things are different depending on perspective. Simply put, vantage point
recognizes that where and how close you are looking at something makes a definite difference in
what you see. Dialectics "takes change as the given and treats apparent stability as that which
needs to be explained and [] provides the specialized concepts and frameworks to explain it."
(Ollman, 1993, p. 3).
Vantage point may be the mode of abstraction that explains the differing Marxist
theories of the state discussed earlier that have evolved over time. Apparent contradictions in
Marx's theory of the state may be resolved by recognizing their different, or even diametrical,
vantage points. (Ollman, 1993, p. 67-8). Vantage point results in the creation of a "perspective
that colors everything which falls into it, establishing order, hierarchy, and priorities, distributing
values, meanings, and degrees of relevance, and asserting a distinctive coherence between the
parts." (Ollman, 1993, p. 67-8).
Because of the nature of abstractions of extension and level of generality, as each
changes or is revised the vantage point will undergo a corresponding change. Put simply, if the
abstraction of extension is larger, then more can be seen from the resulting vantage point, and
connections may be observed which would be excluded from a narrower extension and a
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correspondingly narrower vantage point.
Abstraction of vantage point is import to the identification of identity and
difference.

Just as a broad enough abstraction of extension is required to encompass the

simultaneity of identity and difference, without an appropriate vantage point, the simultaneity
would be impossible to observe. (Ollman, 1993, p. 73).

"[O]ne's ability to actually see and

therefore to examine either set of qualities depends on the vantage point adopted for viewing
them." (Ollman, 1993, p. 73). "Even when the shift in vantage point appears to be slight, the
difference in the perspective opened up can be considerable." (Ollman, 1993, p. 73).

Ollman

notes that change is typically seen as "a comparison of two or more differentiated states in the
development of the object or condition or group under examination." (Ollman, 1993, p. 29).
Here dialectics, instead, urges us to examine the same state from different views rather than
different states from the same view but at different times. This distinction is foundational to the
dialectical method. Marx allows us to alter these abstractions throughout the examination when
undertaking this examination. (Ollman, 1993, p. 42).
5.3

Examples of the Use of Dialectics in Geography
Having examined all three modes or aspects of abstraction, it is important to note

that each is relevant not only to the abstraction of the parts but also to the recreated whole. That
is, conclusions drawn from a particular abstraction of extension at a particular level of generality
likewise must be viewed at the same extension and level of generality in order to be understood,
evaluated, and revised. (Ollman, 1993, p. 61). While more than one level of abstraction can be
simultaneously considered, it will be necessary to be careful not to mix abstractions of extension
and/or abstractions of level of generality in putting the dialectical method to use in this
dissertation. "In practice, these three decisions (really, three aspects of the same decision) as to
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extension, level of generality, and vantage point are usually made together and their effects are
immediate, though on any given occasion one or another of them may appear to dominate."
(Ollman, 1993, p. 69).
In attempting to use these three modes of abstraction, the work of others is also
instructive. Sayer's work urging the adoption of post disciplinary studies is relevant in that the
dialectical abstraction involved herein will necessarily cross disciplinary boundaries. (Sayer,
2003). First, Sayer proposes avoiding reductionism and inappropriate causal attributions by
dismissing the primacy of disciplines and whether ideas can be identified with any particular
one. (Sayer, 2003). Such an analysis allows reference to and reliance upon literature outside
human geography as additional support for the dialectical abstractions which will be attempted
by this dissertation. Issues related to the state and uneven development logically cannot be
restricted to the discipline of geography, and making connections with literature outside
geography is an opportunity which should not be missed. Ollman notes that Marx would urge us
to incorporate existing work into our abstractions, lest we be trapped in isolation. (Ollman,
1993, p. 27).
Consistent with Sayer's suggestion to follow ideas and connections wherever they
lead instead of following them only as far as the border of their discipline, this dissertation will
transcend traditional boundaries of uneven development literature and geographical literature
regarding the state to incorporate into the attempted dialectical abstractions, relevant work
regardless of disciplinary boundaries.

(Sayer, 2003).

Existing literature will be critically

reviewed and analyzed, and connections made between theoretical advancements to date, in an
effort to reveal the full potential of the dialectical method.
As further justification for the use of dialectics in this dissertation, Ollman
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appropriately notes that "reality is more than appearances, and that focusing exclusively on
appearances, on the evidence that strikes us immediately and directly, can be extremely
misleading." (Ollman, 1993, p. 11). He continues that "understanding anything in our everyday
experience requires that we know something about how it arose and developed and how it fits
into the larger context or system of which it is a part." (Ollman, 1993, p. 11). For Ollman
concludes that:
After all, few would deny that everything in the world is changing
and interacting at some pace and, in one way or another, that
history and systemic connections belong to the real world. The
difficulty has always been how to think about them, how not to
distort them, and how to give them the attention and weight they
deserve. Dialectics is an attempt to resolve this difficulty by
expanding our notion of anything to include, as aspects of what it
is, both the process by which it has become and the broader
interactive context in which it is found.
(Ollman, 1993, p. 11). Such a focus on process and connections is well suited for incorporation
of Massey's work on networks and Howitt's work on relations into the analysis in this
dissertation.
Massey's work is closely tied to spatial practices. Her examination of the tensions
between the political, the cultural, and the economic, what she terms the "geometries of power,"
is important to the definition of spatial practices. (Massey, 1993).

Swyngedouw recognized

these geometries in his own work. (Swyngedouw, 1997).
Like Ollman, Massey rejects traditional theoretical boundaries of analysis. She
sees conceptualizations that are constructed in an introverted, inward-looking, historical way
based on origins and that require the drawing of boundaries as problematic.
recognizes that like people, places have multiple identities. (Massey, 1993).

Instead, she

These identities

may be implicated in the state's control of and influence over uneven development. These
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aspects of her work shed light on the tensions brought about by rescaling.
Massey's alternative interpretation suggests examining points in the intersection
of social relations. The uniqueness of place, or a locality, for her is formed by particular
interactions and mutual articulations of social relations, social processes, experiences and
understandings, in a situation of co-presence, but where a large proportion of those relations,
experiences, and understandings are actually constructed on a much larger scale than what we
happen to define for that moment as the place itself, whether that be a street, a region, or even a
continent. (Massey, 1993). Massey urges us to look at moments in networks of social relations.
(Massey, 1993). This interpretation is closely tied to the abstraction of vantage point which
serves as one of the foundational aspects of dialectics.
Howitt advances that concepts are most meaningful when made real by
understanding the complex and dynamic relationships and processes in context, a position that,
like Massey, is closely tied to the examination of spatial practices. (Howitt, 2003). Howitt
recognizes that tension between globalization and locality research was often a product of
research paradigms that failed to deal with the simultaneity and complexity of power relations,
identity, and difference that Massey saw as challenging naive notions of space. (Howitt, 2003).
Such naive notions of space made any consideration of concepts such as state involvement in
place building, the politics of identity, power relations, and uneven development impossible,
because those conceptions of space and scale did not allow for examination of the relations
between scales. Howitt argues that it is precisely the failure to undertake meaningful analysis
across scales that has been problematic in operationalizing scale as a fundamental concept with
practical rather than merely rhetorical value. (Howitt, 2003).
Merrifield's work is more directly connected to state spatial practices. Neither
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Massey nor Howitt examine the spatial practices of the state, whereas Merrifield indirectly
implicates state spatial practices in his examination of the relationships between space and place.
Merrifield has already successfully used dialectics in the spatial context when he examined
LeFebvre's spatialized dialectic and theorized the specific dialectics of space and place.
(Merrifield, 1993, p. 519). Merrifield argues against a Cartesian viewpoint with its dualism of
place.

He argues there is no polarity between subjective and objective realms of place.

(Merrifield, 1993).
Merrifield provides a foundation for the examination of spatial practices, because
spatial practices implicate both aspects of space and place. Traditionally, place has been thought
of as state constructed (Tuan, 1977). Merrifield segues us from state constructed place to capital
space in discussing the capitalist space-place relationship.

(Merrifield, 1993. p. 520-521).

Merrifield suggests that space is not the abstract with place being more concrete, and he urges us
to consider space and place together.
For Merrifield there is no real distinction between circulating and fixed capital;
they are just different moments in capitalism. As a result, his theorizations transcend more
traditional conceptualizations of place. He notes that when capitalism takes place somewhere,
capital fixity results which forms "place." (Merrifield, 1993). This notation recognizes capital's
construction of place and capital's identity and difference where capitalism itself is both a thing
(produced space) and a process. For Merrifield, social space is a form of production itself. The
interpenetration of opposites is recognized when Merrifield notes that this capital form can be
both a space and a place at the same time. (Merrifield, 1993).
Merrifield also sheds light on the production of space and place as spatial
practices by noting that capitalist space internalizes conflict. Social forces and social conflict are
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"inscribed in place," and there is a tension between the use of place for social purposes and for
domination, as will be seen in the case study of Appalachian land acquisitions. The bottom line
is that the relationship between space and place is understood by the relation between fixed and
circulating capital. Fixed capital is place. Circulating capital is in space. The spatial practices
that determine where and when each can reside are the subject of this dissertation.
Ollman notes that a fully adequate theory of the state, which would answer all of
the important questions, could only be constructed by integrating aspects of the dialectical
method. (Ollman, 1993). In this dissertation, the dialectical method will be applied to capital
accumulation strategies and state spatial practices to attempt a more complete theorization of the
state's role in uneven development. Obviously conceptual development of a comprehensive
theory of the state would require abstraction of additional elements not selected for inclusion
herein. Dialectics is well suited to these two analyses, however. With regard to the newly
developed concept of flexible rescaling, the preference of the dialectical method for explanation
of the various forms change assumes and why it appears to have stopped, instead of a preference
to explain why something starts to change, is particularly well suited.

"[T]he subject of

dialectics is change, all change, and interaction, all kinds and degrees of interaction." (Ollman,
1993, p. 23). The changes predicated upon dualistic capital accumulation strategies and brought
about by flexible rescaling are at the heart of this dissertation.
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Chapter 6
A New Examination of the State's Role in Uneven Development
While Brenner, Smith, and Harvey, attempt theorizations of the state's role in
uneven geographic development, and while non-geographers such as Marxist social theorists like
Milliband and Poulantzas also attempted to explain the role of the state in uneven development,
the state’s spatial role remains under theorized.

No geographer or non-geographer has

adequately explained how the state actively controls uneven development through its spatial
practices.
The rise of neo-liberalism has not diminished the importance of the state as many
both liberal and conservative theorists have surmised. The state intervenes in the workings of the
affairs of capital to assist capital just as it always has. (Harvey, 2006, p. 28). Such continued
intervention makes examination of the state's spatial role, and how that role is fulfilled, more
important than ever.
The state actively employs rescaling as a spatial practice to control and impact
uneven development for the benefit of capital, but it does so without formally restructuring. The
state employs flexible rescaling inherent in the state system to control uneven development.
Flexible rescaling is a new concept that explains the state's ability to maintain
control over influences on capital accumulation to assist capital, particularly in times when
public consent for its interventions wane. "The preferred form of governance is that of the
'public-private partnership' in which state and key business interests collaborate closely together
to coordinate their activities around the aim of enhancing capital accumulation." (Harvey, 2006,
p. 27). Such partnerships are often accomplished by flexible rescaling.

"[L]arge corporate

capitalist interests typically collaborate with government power in policy making as well as in
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the creation of new [] institutional arrangements." (Harvey, 2006, p. 26). Flexible rescaling
represents one way that this collaboration is accomplished. In terms of flexible rescaling, the
"policy making" referenced by Harvey is an allusion to governmental policy, whether or not
reduced to written law, which allows the state to intervene in the capital process to the benefit of
capital.
The concept of flexible rescaling is equally applicable across scales and for the
state's assistance with accumulation by dispossession both in its original or primitive form as
well as when it is used to stave off crisis, as Harvey recognized. The case studies which follow
this preliminary conceptual explanation of the concept will develop further, explain, and
illustrate the workings of flexible rescaling generally through an examination of state supported
land practices in Appalachia.
The basic premise of flexible rescaling is that state power cannot always be
deployed at the same scale to assist capital. Harvey alluded to flexibility as a harbinger of rescue
for capital when he noted:
The free mobility of capital between sectors and
regions is regarded as crucial to reviving profit rates
and all barriers to that movement (such as planning
controls) have to be removed except in those areas
crucial to "the national interest" (however that may
be conveniently defined). The watchword of the
neoliberal state is, therefore, "flexibility" (in labor
markets and in the deployment of investment
capital).
(Harvey, 2006, p. 25). While here Harvey falls short of extending this flexibility to rescaling of
the state as an active spatial practice, he alludes to capital's need for flexible rescaling of its own
actions to ensure continued expansion. The flexible rescaling of state power proves just as
necessary and, as will be seen, functions much the same way toward the same ends.
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Flexible rescaling comes in two forms: stratified shifts in power up and down and
lateral intra-scaler shifts in power. While initial deployment of state power, whether by coercion
or force, may be best placed at one scale, the need may arise (often through public withdrawal of
consent) to devolve that state power at a different scale to achieve the same goal. Similarly,
while it may have been initially sufficient to deploy state power at only one scale, the need may
arise for additional concurrent pressure or influence from another scale to assist with the
accumulation process. The converse is obviously also true: state power imposition from more
than one scale may be the initial push for assistance to capital, only later for the state to
recognize that concentration of the state's power at a single scale would be better placed. The
inherent flexibility of the system is what allows for these stratified shifts of power up and down
within the system as well as for lateral transfers of power within a particular scale that also
amount to flexible rescaling. Factors that influence these decisions, particularly consent, will be
explored below.
As discussed above, it is well established that capital accumulation takes two
forms: accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by expanded reproduction. Within
accumulation by dispossession, two distinct forms emerge. First, the primitive or initial form of
accumulation by dispossession is long recognized by traditional Marxist theory and will be
explored here in terms of eminent domain. Second, in The New Imperialism, Harvey recognized
a second use for accumulation by dispossession- to stave off crises of over-accumulation once
accumulation by dispossession has transitioned into accumulation by expanded reproduction, and
once accumulation by expanded reproduction is firmly underway- and will be explored here in
terms of mountaintop removal. Briefly, the need for such accumulation by dispossession occurs
when a spatio-temporal fix is not otherwise available to bail capital out of impending crisis.
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Chapter 7
State Flexible Rescaling and Land Acquisition: Examples from Appalachia
Having defined flexible rescaling as the state's ability to maintain control at
differing scales over influences on capital accumulation to assist capital, particularly in times
when public consent for its interventions wane, we can look at examples of flexible rescaling in
Appalachia as an illustration. Three concrete examples of state flexible rescaling in Appalachia
are examined herein.
To better understand these examples, we must recall that from the new theory of
state flexible rescaling, we know that the state actively flexible rescales in two ways, by action
and by inaction. We know that the state does so to benefit capital when power retention at the
current scale or an anticipated shift in power would not serve the interests of capital. We also
know that the system is inherently flexible; that is, the system has the power to change the scale
of state action without formal restructuring of the state.
In examples within Appalachia we can see the state actively flexibly rescaling in
two ways, by action and by inaction. First, by action we can see the state taking affirmative state
actions at one scale when the anticipated scale does not benefit capital. In such cases, when
capital expresses or demonstrates a need or a benefit that the state cannot fill at that scale, the
state will actively shift power up or devolve power down or move power laterally to accomplish
for capital what capital needs. Second, similarly, state inactions can amount to state flexible
rescaling. In such instances of state inaction, we see the state refusing to act resulting in state
spatial practices that are inactions. In such cases, when state inaction occurs at a time when there
would have been a natural shift in power upward or downward that would not have benefited
capital, then the state’s inaction amounts to an active state spatial practice that is flexible
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rescaling.
While the examples illustrate these two state spatial practices of action and
inaction that amount to state flexible rescaling that benefits capital, they also illustrate the
flexibility inherent in the system. The examples illustrate the flexibility inherent in the system in
different ways. First, the judiciary with its levels of appeal has a built in spatial distribution that
allows power to move upward by appeals and downward by remands and through Court orders
mandating further action at a lesser scale. Second, the executive power system of the local, state,
and federal government has the same flexibility inherent in the system allowing shifts of power
within the executive branch between these scales inherent in the system.
First, land acquisitions at the time of the early transition from subsistence farming
toward a more complete industrialization illustrate changes in the executive system that
facilitated state accumulation by dispossession. Second, land acquisitions by eminent domain,
particularly through the definition of public use and the battle for high voltage power
transmission lines within Appalachia illustrate changes in the judiciary system that facilitated
additional accumulation by expanded reproduction in Appalachia through devaluation and
redistribution. Third, land acquisitions for mountaintop removal illustrate a spatio-temporal fix
that staved off crisis in industry in Appalachia.
7.1
Land Acquisitions Illustrating Flexible Rescaling: Accumulation by
Dispossession and the Transition to Early Industrialism
The state’s active role in flexibly rescaling is evident during the development of
accumulation by dispossession in Appalachia during the early transition to industrialism where
we see two primary state spatial practices at different scales working in tandem to benefit capital:
first, the state spatial practice of actively creating and maintaining a land recording system at the
local scale that allowed capital land agents to buy and retain land resources cheaply and that
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simultaneously created a cheap labor force for capital as a result of the dispossession and,
second, a state spatial practice at the federal scale where the resulting industrialization is
regulated by the federal government in a way that reduces competition and allows capital
expansion through the continued exploitation of that land and labor.
Harvey has provided us with examples of accumulation that allow us to examine
flexible rescaling here. The early transition examined here was specifically noted within the
examples he provided.

(Harvey, 2006, p. 43).

Harvey included within his examples of

accumulation by dispossession "commodification and privatization of land and the forceful
expulsion of peasant populations" and "commodification of labor power and the suppression of
alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption." (Harvey, 2006, p. 43). Harvey
did recognize that the "state, with its monopoly of violence and definition of legality, plays a
crucial role in both backing and promoting these processes," but how that role was played was
never defined before now. (Harvey, 2006, p. 43).
Harvey’s theorization can be extended here where we see the state’s role clearly
in the example where Appalachian subsistence farmers sold their land to capital’s land agents at
a local scale who recorded the transactions using recording system created and maintained as a
state spatial practice at that local scale that benefitted capital. Those prior land owners then
transitioned into wage labor, having been dispossessed with the state’s aid at the local scale of
their most powerful resource- their land. As they become new wage laborers, we see the state
flexibly rescale power to continue to benefit capital. Having exhausted the state’s power at the
local scale available to benefit capital, those new wage labors are then regulated by a second
state spatial practice at the federal scale following passage of capital-friendly legislation
regulating the industrial workplace. We see the state recalling its power from the local scale to
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the federal scale to allow additional benefit to capital which would not have been available had
power not been actively shifted – or flexibly rescaled- by the state.
Two state actions, flexibly rescaled from the local scale to the federal scale were
at play. On the local scale, land sales made possible and sanctioned by state actions left the land
behind for the use and benefit of absentee landowner capital as a cheap resource and left the
inexpensive labor created by dispossessing those landowners at the same time. On the federal
scale, following the flexible rescaling, the laborers and their working conditions are regulated by
the federal scale when control at the local scale becomes impractical. Note here that the flexible
nature of the system is revealed by the example where the state is not required to restructure in
order to change the locus of power.
Specifically exemplified, most generally speaking, during the period from
approximately the 1880's through approximately the 1930's, like much of Appalachia, West
Virginia underwent a transformation from a partially agrarian self-sufficiency or "competency"
state, where development and commercialization was uneven and a lack of transportation,
capital, and technology was pervasive to a more complete industrialization. (Lewis, 1998). By
1930, most Appalachian income had shifted to non-agricultural employment. Mountaineers
were previously living off the land, largely independent of the state’s influences. But, by 1930
many had taken jobs in mining, logging, textiles, and public work. (Eller, 1982, p. xix).
Appalachian scholar Paul Salstrom argues that the decline of economic selfsufficiency in Appalachia is also result of land destroying agricultural practices such as slashand-burn farming, poor timber practices, the destruction of the Civil War, and New Deal politics.
(Salstrom, 1997). Here we can see the state’s actions and inactions at play again though the
second active state spatial practice referenced above. The 1933 National Industrial Recover Act
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(NIRA), a piece of legislation at the national scale, formed an important spatial practice, and the
subsequent Wagner Act (the National Labor Relations Act) in 1935, another piece of legislation
at the national scale that formed an important spatial practice, increased coal prices and increased
wages which, in Appalachia, translated into increased automation of coal loading and decreased
jobs, slowing the pace of industrialization with regard to workers, but continuing its ascent with
regard to capital, (Salstrom, 1994). This state spatial practice at the federal scale of enacting
national legislation was promoted as helping workers, but it actually helped capital in the end as
capital found mechanization in the wake of industrial decline.
While NIRA created the federal public works program, it also allowed the federal
government through its executive branch to permit concerted capital action and monopoly as a
means of stimulating the economy.

Specifically, NIRA provided that “the President is

authorized to enter into agreements with, and to approve voluntary agreements between and
among, persons engaged in a trade or industry, labor organizations, and trade or industrial
organizations, associations, or groups, relating to any trade or industry, if in his judgment such
agreements will aid in effectuating the policy of this title with respect to transactions in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” (NIRA, 1933). The stated policy of NIRA included
“remov[ing] obstructions to the free flow of interstate and foreign commerce which tend to
diminish the amount thereof,” “promoting the organization of industry for the purpose of
cooperative action among trade groups,” “promot[ing] the fullest possible utilization of the
present productive capacity of industries,” and “avoid[ing] undue restriction of production.”
(NIRA, 1933, Sections 1-3). These federal scale spatial practices of allowing monopoly follow
the stated policy of NIRA, the development of which policy actually exemplifies a state spatial
practice itself.
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But the effects of these active state spatial practices of flexibly rescaling power to
benefit capital were not the only additional state spatial practices ongoing at the time. If we alter
our vantage point again, we can see the state’s inaction (itself another active state spatial
practice) at the federal scale and at the local scale. This inaction was allowing poor economic
conditions to persist and allowing uneven development that benefitted capital by maintaining the
resource pool in under-developed areas to persist.
Salstrom posits that economic dependency in Appalachia persists even until
today, because Appalachian farmers were forced, during the period of rapid industrialization, by
declining living conditions, to take wage earning jobs such as these, illustrating how state spatial
practices exercised long ago at two differing scales have a continued impact. (Salstrom, 1997).
He notes that, as full time farmers, during the late 1800's to early 1900's, they were growing
poorer. Salstrom also employs our changed vantage point to alert us to this other state spatial
practice concurrently at play. He argues that inept federal scale welfare administration and
absentee landownership and control negatively impacted Appalachia during the process of
industrialization. (Salstrom, 1997). According to Salstrom, when people needed help on a
federal scale from the state, it was the state’s inaction that formed a concurrent spatial practice at
the federal level of allowing deprivation that also forced self sufficient farmers toward capital.
The lack of federal welfare administered by the national government at that time was a state
spatial practice at the federal level that forced individuals to work in the coal fields and in the
factories despite the poor industrial and economic conditions that the prior state spatial practice
of legislation enactment explained above had created. This additional spatial practice of inaction
also allowed capital to use those people as an inexpensive resource, because of their artificially
created economic need.
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Specifically, Salstrom argues, with a peripheral rather than a colonial economy
thesis, that reduced wage demands of Appalachian residents created by the state’s action of
withholding welfare administration at a local scale had the result of subsidized company wages
and served to transfer Appalachia's wealth outside of the region. (Salstrom, 1997). Here the
state can be seen rescaling wealth within the capital pool so that uneven economic development
persists. Salstrom argues that Appalachia's early regional scale economy benefitted more from
its prior self-sufficient subsistence farming than its entry into the capitalist money-based
economy during this period of more rapid industrialization. (Salstrom, 1997). However, when
wage labor failed to support fully the mountaineers as the federal government had through the
state action of withholding the administration of welfare and mountaineers looked back to family
farms when industrialization slowed, the industrial economy that the state had supported made a
profitable return to subsistence farming impossible. (Salstrom, 1997). As a result we see this
concurrent state spatial practice of inaction at play benefitting capital expansion.
When examining the early industrialism of Appalachia, the flexible rescaling of
the state actions and inactions that amounted to active state spatial practices can be easily seen
from a number of different vantage points. The flexibility inherent in the system is revealed as
actions at various scales combine to create the dual capital benefit of cheap labor and cheap
resources that resulted in the transition to industrialism.
7.2

Land Acquisitions Illustrating Flexible Rescaling: Eminent Domain

If we fast forward to modern day Appalachia, we can more closely examine two
cases of ongoing dispossession of land and resources which will further illustrate, explain, and
develop the theory of flexible rescaling conceptualized here. First, we see classic accumulation
by dispossession as a means of transferring ownership of resources to allow for classic
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accumulation by expanded reproduction. State spatial practices support intrastate shifts in power
among scales, as illustrated when we examine eminent domain and the expansion of the
definition of public use as well as its implications for electrical power transmission in
Appalachia.
In terms of eminent domain generally, accumulation by dispossession can be seen
within Appalachia occurring as a predicate to accumulation by expanded reproduction, but
eminent domain is an even better illustration of the process of flexible rescaling at work. Recall
that Milliband refers to the state as an "instrument" or "tool" available for use by capital to
ensure the maintenance of conditions of uneven development beneficial to capital. Here we see
the state used by capital in that way. When capital was unable to secure land on its own through
favorable terms that amounted to dispossession, we see capital extend itself into the legal arena
to secure the state’s assistance in obtaining the devalued property necessary to proceed with
capital accumulation.
7.2.1 TrAIL and High Voltage Transmission Lines in Appalachia
Eminent domain generally, as well as specifically with regard to electric
transmission lines within Appalachia, acts as an example and helps develop the theory of flexible
rescaling. State and capital are intertwined and/or the state is used at varying scales as an
instrument of capital to promote eminent domain. Note that once again the flexibility required
and employed is inherent in the system. Flexible rescaling, because of its flexible nature, can
again been seen occurring without requiring formal restructuring of government.
Eminent domain is best explained by the federal government's most prominent
recent eminent domain decision handed down: Kelo. Kelo v. City of New London. In Kelo, the
United States Supreme Court’s decision forms a judicial state spatial practice at the federal scale
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that sanctions the process of taking private land for what is deemed "public benefit." In Kelo,
these "benefits" are couched in terms of urban growth and renewal- in short development and
redevelopment. In this instance, flexible rescaling, initially seen as the primary justification for
accumulation by dispossession for purposes of accumulation by expanded reproduction, is both
justified and sold as beneficial to the public good. Eminent domain, it should be noted, is one of
the clearest examples of flexible rescaling, as is the development of many legal issues, because
the inherent flexibility to rescale is perhaps most transparent when we examine the judicial
system where power flows more freely and in a logical structure designed to allow such flows.
“’Public use’ used to have simple meaning in many quarters: A use was public if
the public used the property.” (Claeys, 2004, p. 2). Recent case law has seen a retreat from
“public use” and the development of a sister theory of “public benefit” which allowed broader
rights for taking land, as well as allowing the development of consent through a new paradigm.
It was under the “public benefit” shift that the taking of land for urban redevelopment, because
of blight, and by capital rather than by the state was sanctioned. We see this “public benefit”
employed to justify power lines, with a concurrent shifting of power flexibly between scales as a
state spatial practice to assist capital with accumulation. Harvey’s grid of spatial practices is
useful in examining how flexible rescaling occurs.
If we return here to Harvey’s grid of spatial practices, and apply it to the state, we
first recall that the grid examines how three different spatial practices work. (Harvey, 1987).
Those three spatial practices are experienced or material spatial practices, perceived spatial
practices, and spaces of representation or imagined spatial practices. (Harvey, 1987). Each can
be applied easily to the state to allow analysis of the state’s active spatial practices and to allow
development of the theory of flexible rescaling.
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In terms of the state’s spatial practices, first, experienced or material spatial
practices are physical flows and transfers made by the state across space and time, illustrated
here by the transfer of property rights. Second, perceived spatial practices are representations of
space or signs and significations put in place by the state that allow transfers to be understood by
the populace, here the creation of a “public benefit” where either none previously existed or
where none exists in actuality. Third, imagined spatial practices or spaces of representation are
mental inventions of new meanings for spatial practices formed by the populace as a result of
state imagined spaces as a means of developing or maintaining consent to the state’s spatial
actions, here the public’s buy-in to the state’s “public benefit.” In the spaces of representation
we can see consent develop as the populace shifts from the esoteric theory of “public benefit” to
an internalized theory of self-benefit.
We can also use Harvey’s grid to examine how these three conceptualizations of
spatial practices impact how people and how the state see and use space. Recall that when
applied to individuals, the grid looked at how people see and use space in four different ways.
(Harvey, 1987). Application of the theory to the four ways the state sees and uses space and to
the four ways people see and use space as a result of the state’s active spatial practices allows a
further development of the theory. These same four ways space is used can be applied to the
state and to people’s spatial reactions to the state simultaneously. Accessibility and distanciation,
appropriation of space, domination of space, and production of space can all be applied to the
state’s active spatial practices within this example, as well as continuing to be simultaneously
applied to individual spatial practices.
First, accessibility and distanciation are the measure of the degree to which
friction of space has been overcome by the state to accommodate capital’s interactions. As the
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state rescales, for example from state regulation to federal regulation as we see in the threatened
state rescaling of power through a shift of approval power for the TrAIL high transmission
electrical lines from the state public service commissions to the appeal for federal approval of the
line which was (and remains) waiting in the wings in the event capital’s hopes of expansion are
dashed by a failure of all involved states to approve, route, and permit the lines in question,
friction is decreased and public consent grows. Harvey referred to distance as both a barrier to
and a defense against social interaction. (Harvey, 1987). Here we can see distance or scale used
as a barrier and a defense to active state spatial practices in the form of regulation.
Second, appropriation of space is how space is taken or assumed by individuals.
Here we see how the state’s active spatial practices allow capital to take or assume space through
the promulgation of rules and case law that allow for eminent domain in circumvention of the
apparent limitations of the Fifth Amendment. The state’s approvals (both in terms of allowing
the process to proceed and in approving the process once it is underway) amount to spatial
practices that allow space to be taken or assumed by capital for capital’s benefit, whether or not
couched in terms of public use and/or public benefit.
Third, domination of space by individuals or powerful groups, as defined by
Harvey, is the legal or extra-legal means to control space. There is no explanation required to
allow the extension of this element to the state’s spatial practices.
Last, production of space is how new systems and representations are formed.
Here we see how the individual or populace image of uneven development is molded by active
state spatial practices that achieve Gramsci’s hegemony through state sanctioned accumulation
practices. The populace forms a new impression of eminent domain when it is internalized,
resulting in achievement of consent.
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Using this spatial grid, and applying it to active state spatial practices, we can
better use the case of power lines as an illustration as well as to further develop a theory of
flexible rescaling of power which continues. When we change our perspective and/or our
vantage point, the actions of the state can be seen in the same framework developed by Harvey to
examine individual spatial practices. When we examine the facts and procedural history of Kelo,
the applicability of Harvey’s grid to these state spatial practices becomes even more apparent.
Returning to Kelo, which was introduced briefly previously, recall generally that
Kelo reaffirmed authority to take private lands for economic purposes. Specifically, the city of
New London, Connecticut, used its eminent domain powers to take temporary ownership of
private property before selling the property to private real estate developers.
Back in February 1998, Pfizer, Inc. announced that it was developing a global
research facility on a site adjacent to the neighborhood where Susette Kelo and others lived. In
April 1998, the city council of the city of New London granted the request of the New London
Development Corporation (“NLDC”) to prepare a development plan for the area in question. It
should be noted that the NLDC was a private, non-profit corporation formed in 1978, allegedly
to assist the City in planning economic development for the city. The plan created included a
waterfront hotel, a conference center, and approximately 80 new private homes, among other
“economic developments” denominated as for “public use.” According to the plan, the NLDC
would own the land located in the development area but would lease it to private developers for
$1 per year under a 99 year lease.
The residents of New London, led by Susette Kelo, wanted to challenge the
development and the justification for it. Under Connecticut law, however, property owners can
challenge only the amount of compensation offered, not the right of the government to take their
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property, which is why the case was brought under the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution. In response to the initial challenge, the city, through the NLDC argued that the sale
and subsequent development of the land would foster economic development and create a new
tax base and, therefore, did not violate the Takings Clause. Susette Kelo, on her own behalf and
on behalf of and others who also had property taken by the city of New London sued the city in
Connecticut state court. Susette Kelo argued, on behalf of all of the property owners, that their
rights under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause were violated. The Takings Clause provides
“...nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” (US Const.,
Amend. V.). The Fifth Amendment did not create the national government's right to use eminent
domain power or to allow others to use it. All the Fifth Amendment did was to limit taking to
“public use.” In 1791, when the Fifth Amendment was added the battle over the ultimate
definition of “public use” was yet to be waged.
The battle was waged, largely, when Susette Kelo’s case was tried and, with
regard to certain land owners the Superior Court’s Memorandum opinion indicated that the City
had not demonstrated that the land would be used for public use. The Memorandum opinion was
appealed. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Connecticut was entered on March 9, 2004. A
four-justice majority of the Court held that none of the challenged condemnations violated the
United States or Connecticut Constitutions. Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration was filed
by Susette Kelo which was denied on April 20, 2004. Susette Kelo then appealed the case to the
United States Supreme Court pursuant to the Supreme Court’s federal question jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a).
The case was briefed and argued before the United States Supreme Court. Justice John
Paul Stevens delivered the majority opinion of the Court on Thursday, June 23, 2005, upholding
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the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision 5-4. Kelo v. City of New London. The Court held
that the city's taking of the private property of Kelo and others and the city’s subsequent sale of
that property to private real estate developers did in fact qualify as a "public use" within the
meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Kelo
v. City of New London. The Court noted that the city did not take the land solely to benefit a
certain group of private individuals. Instead, the Court decided that the City was following a
legitimate economic development plan it had created. As a result, the United States Supreme
Court, in its own state spatial practice, which had been rescaled from the Connecticut State
Supreme Court, held that the taking at issue in Kelo qualified as "public use" even though the
land was not going to be used by the public. The spatial practice was determinative of the issue
of whether the Fifth Amendment required "literal" public use. The majority of the Court held
that broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 'public purpose' was sufficient, and
the application of the doctrine of eminent domain was altered. Kelo v. City of New London.
Simplified, the Taking Clause basically guarantees that government will not take
private property for public use without just compensation. Here the property owners argued
taking private property and selling it to private real estate developers was not a public use. The
property owners argued that, unlike in blight cases, where arguably the public would benefit
from condemnation, there is nothing in the act of condemning non-blighted properties that
constitutes a public purpose. The Connecticut State Supreme Court disagreed and ruled for the
city of New London. The United States Supreme Court ultimately upheld that ruling. The
rescaling of power necessary to defend the legitimizing of the state’s spatial practice is inherent,
and the flexibility inherent in the system by which the rescaling occurred is well illustrated.
While, jurisprudentially, it appears clear that the Fifth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution should limit how and when the government's eminent domain power can be
exercised, when “public good” or “public benefit” is involved, the Fifth Amendment frequently
is not interpreted by Courts to limit or preclude eminent domain invocation. Phrases such as
“blight remediation,” “economic development,” “renewal,” or “urban revitalization” have all
been cast as "public use" or “public benefit” sufficient to allow the circumvention of what would
appear to be clear Fifth Amendment dictates. Moreover, what constitutes “just compensation”
has also become a matter of legal debate as we see Harvey’s devaluation for accumulation at
play as a means to reduce what “just compensation” would constitute in the face of claims of
economic blight. In the end, when and how eminent domain can be used and what constitutes
“just compensation” are factors determined by the state through either the legislature or the
courts, the decision as between them also being made as a part of the flexible rescaling theorized
herein.
These political entities acting in the “public interest” or determining “public use”
frequently act in the best interest of capital while declaring “public use.” When he contends that
"the whole history of legal decisions which, in most bourgeois democracies, favor the rights of
private property . . . over social justice," Harvey is somewhat short-sighted, failing to recognize
that the tendency of the judiciary depends on whose private property rights are being eschewed.
(Harvey, 2006, p. 51). Elsewhere, his recognition that privatization entails not only private but
class privileged domains arguably accounts for this shortcoming. (Harvey, 2006, p. 45). In the
above described Kelo case the state flexibly rescales its judiciary power to provide capital the
benefit of subsidized economic growth through sanctioned dispossession in favor of capital.
The rationale of the Kelo case has been extended into Appalachia through the
routing and approval of power transmission lines. The federal government, in that instance,
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initially made a scalar decision, employing an active spatial power, that it would be unable to
justify the need for power lines that would be built if privately owned land was dispossessed.
Political power, as a result, was spatially devolved to the regional scale to make such a
justification. This devolution of power constitutes an active spatial practice of the state flexibly
rescaled to the regional scale.
At that regional scale, PJM entered the picture in Appalachia to sell theories of
instability, national insecurity, and rolling blackouts to justify the building of the line altogether.
Another rescaling can be seen where approval of the projects, siting of the lines, and permitting
was devolved further by an active state spatial practice from the regional scale to the state scale
to state Public Service Commissions or Public Utility Commissions. Finally, construction of the
lines would have to occur within the states. State public service commissions got involved to
approve the routes for the lines and to bolster and ratify PJM's claim of need for a line, but an
obstacle arose at the local level.
Strong local opposition to the building of the lines meant that states, either eager
to or required to satisfy their constituents to maintain power, might not approve the routing of the
lines or ratify the need for the lines. Now, the approval processes, which included rerouting of
some lines to quash opposition and build at least tacit consent, resides in the states. But as a final
state spatial practice, active flexible rescaling is employed from a system with inherent
flexibility. Additional flexibility within the state to rescale again exists in the system in the form
of federal backstop authority at the federal scale.
Section 368 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) directed the Federal
Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, and the Interior to designate corridors
for electricity transmission and distribution facilities on Federal lands in 11 contiguous Western
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States (Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming), to perform necessary environmental review, and to incorporate the
designated corridors into relevant agency land use and resource management plans. The
secretaries are to consider national need for additional infrastructure and to take actions (spatial
practices) to “improve reliability, relieve congestion, and enhance the capability of the national
grid to deliver energy.” EPAct also allowed the secretaries to identify corridors in the other 39
states and allowed the secretary to engage in spatial practices which would “expedite processes”
for energy projects in the corridors, thereby providing federal legislative authority for federal
backstop powers in the event the devolution of power to the states for approval of the electrical
transmission line projects was unsuccessful in allowing capital expansion and flexible rescaling
was again required. It should be noted that Section 368 of EPAact also instructs agencies to
form corridors for oil, gas, and hydrogen pipelines.
As a result, by passing the Energy Act of 2005 into law, the state, at the federal
government scale, retained the right to declare national energy corridors if the states failed to
approve the need for and routing of a high voltage transmission line like the one at issue with the
TrAIL project. Once declared, the state could flexibly rescale and the federal government could
reassume power from the states to approve the process, ultimately flexibly rescaling to approve
both the building and the routing of the lines if states would not.
In this example, the power to take the land needed for the lines, the power to
declare a need for the lines, and the power to control the routing of the lines can be seen
manifesting itself to the benefit of capital at various scales at various times to ensure the building
of the transmission lines in question. The state’s active spatial practice of both changing the
scale of power and of building into the system a flexible means by which the scale of power
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could be changed if necessary amounts to flexible rescaling in action.
In this example we see a flexibility created in the system to anticipate a potential
need to rescale. Whereas the judiciary and executive branches were created with flexibility
inherent, the regulatory system on the executive side also possesses the ability, through
employment of the legislative branch when laws are enacted or on its own through rule-making
powers granted to the executive to create flexibility within the system in case power to regulate
needs shifted. When EPAct included federal backstop authority at the federal scale, and when
PMJ was created at the regional scale, additional flexibility was built into the system by
legislative action so that transfers of power are possible if necessary.
Thereafter, where it is thought to be most efficient to act on a federal level
unnoticed, then power is flexibly rescaled and devolved at that scale. When it is thought to be
most efficient to act on a regional level, then power is flexibly rescaled and devolved at that scale
to built consent by creating a general need for the project. And when it is thought to be most
efficient to act on a state level, fracturing opposition and obtaining further consent, this time by
force if necessary, then power is flexibly rescaled and devolved at that scale. Importantly, note
that when the chosen scale reveals itself not to be the most efficient without opposition, then a
flexibility inherent in the system is used to redistribute the power to sanction or approve the
decision to another scale by state spatial practices that amount to flexibly rescaling.
Capital has become so dependent on this flexible rescaling and on state support
for capital accumulation and its corresponding uneven development, that capitalists assume their
expansion requests will be fulfilled. "Then we'll take it," she said, when one West Virginia
landowner asked "what if we do not want to sell [our property to the power company]?"
(Dominion Post, April 16, 2008). This demonstrated dependence on flexible rescaling to get the
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job done shows how flexible rescaling operates unseen to guarantee to capital the ability to
transition seamlessly between forms of capital accumulation to create continuing uneven
development.
The eminent domain practices attempted here, with high voltage power
transmission lines, reflect Harvey's realization that "[a]ccumulation by dispossession entails a
very different set of practices from accumulation through the expansion of wage labor in industry
and agriculture." (Harvey, 2006, p. 52). Harvey notes that "dispossession ... is fragmented and
particular-- a privatization here, an environmental degradation there, a financial crisis of
indebtedness somewhere else." (Harvey, 2006, p. 52). The linear path of dispossessions in
electrical transmission line disputes over miles, counties, and states fragments the possibility of
effective resistance and diminishes the ability to coordinate resistance across regulated areas.
This inability to mount effective resistance is characteristic of accumulation by dispossession as
Harvey defined it. Specifically, Harvey noted that accumulation by expanded reproduction
"gave rise to an oppositional culture (such as that embedded in trade unions and working class
political parties)." (Harvey, 2006, p. 52). Here, with fragmented dispossession, opposition
organized around shared culture is diminished. Examining this process from the vantage point of
the state, capital, and the landowners potentially impacted by the construction of the lines allows
a clearer picture of when, how, and why power is shifted by the state.
The shift in the definition of public use discussed in this example and the active
state spatial practice of flexible rescaling that accompanied that shift with regard to power lines
reflect the fact that "[c]apitalist activity is always grounded somewhere.

Diverse material

processes (physical, ecological, as well as social) must be appropriated, used, bent and re-shaped
to the purposes and paths of capital accumulation." (Harvey, 2006, p. 78). The United States
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Supreme Court did just that with its Kelo decision and in the case of TrAIL and the power line
battles that followed it.
7.2.2

Mountaintop Removal in Appalachia

If we examine a second resource dispossession within Appalachia, different
aspects of flexible rescaling, as well as flexible rescaling in a different context—that of
accumulation by dispossession to stave off a crisis, can be developed.

We can examine

Harvey’s second kind of accumulation by dispossession—that employed to stave off crisis—as
employing multi-scalar transitions that amount to flexible rescaling as an active spatial practice
of the state when we examine mountaintop removal in Appalachia. In examining mountaintop
removal we also can see, for the first time, lateral flexible rescaling, illustrating another aspect of
the system’s inherent flexibility. Unlike in the other examples where power is pushed up or
down to benefit capital interests, here power is shifted laterally to benefit capital interests, as will
be more fully explored below.
Mountaintop removal appeared as an industrial advance that rose from the
continuing unevenness in coal that has marked Appalachian industrialization. This unevenness
set the stage for the emergence if this new state supported advance. Here, the historical context
of the development of the coal industry in Appalachia proves important.
Despite dating Appalachian industrialization squarely between 1880 and 1930,
Eller recognizes that as early as the 1790's small quantities of coal were mined in some areas of
Appalachia. (Eller, 1982, p. 4). In fact, as early as the 1740's, rich coal and iron deposits were
documented in the mountains. (Eller, 1982, p. 44). After 1900, the practice of combining coal
and timber interests in the land companies to fully exploit the available resources of the land,
however, changed the character of the coal industry. (Eller, 1982, p. 95). The timber industry
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declined rapidly after its apex in 1909, (Eller, 1982, p. 109) and the coal industry rose to the
industrial forefront.
A major source of population increase between 1880 and 1930 was attributable to
the coal boom. (Eller, 1982, p. 134). The demand for coal increased steadily after 1900. (Eller,
1982). In 1917, the Scotts Run coal field in northern West Virginia opened with an industrial
fervor largely unmatched, sparking early coal primacy in the northern coal fields. By 1932 the
industry had virtually collapsed everywhere. The five mile long hollow of Scotts Run was one
of the most intensely developed coal districts in the United States. (Lewis, 2002). As a result of
such development, as discussed in the first example, many West Virginians left their agricultural
living for coal mining.

At the same time, Appalachians outside West Virginia were not

benefitting yet from coal's industrialization of the mountains. It would take time for the coal
industry to spread south with increased wartime demand.
When post-war demand decreased, the labor-capital conflict intensified. (Lee,
1969). This conflict, like the industry generally, also developed unevenly. Worker cooperation
through labor unions organized along the class divide was viewed as radical. (Lewis, 2002).
The state attempted to crush such cooperation, and it did so under the banner of Americanization.
(Hennen, 1998). But coal conflict intensified in southern West Virginia and Eastern Kentucky,
and violence erupted in those areas. (Lee, 1969; Corbin, 1981; and Hevener, 1978).
Within the coal industry, a further economic sector division occurred. Federal
coal price legislation caused a shift in buying habits away from middle operators to the coal
giants. Those industrialized giants, however, did not absorb the unemployment that flowed from
the abandonment of mines by the small and middle operators. Following the closure of most
smaller mines, a later price differentiation of ten cents per ton of coal was placed into the federal
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regulations, but that price differential was applied too late to respond to the outflow of business
from small and middle operators to larger enterprises when those smaller operators could not
compete with lesser grade coal at one fixed, higher price, and big capital backed by the state
prevailed.
Federal Regulations governing the processing and sale of coal had mandated that
all coal be sold at the same price, meaning that there was no demand for coal of lower quality
when consumers, whether individual or industrial, would have to pay the same price regardless.
Here we see scaled state actions impacting capital long before the advent of mountaintop
removal. Middle operators were put out of business by the state's economic regulation of the
industry to the benefit of capital. Capital accumulation in the hands of big capital resulted as the
larger operators absorbed the benefits and profit of smaller operators and experienced a much
needed capital expansion in that regard.
Greater industrialization of the coal industry also led to a dramatic reduction in
costs of production for the largest producers and the concomitant elimination of thousands of
mining jobs. Practices which sacrificed the environment and the livelihoods of Appalachians,
sanctioned by the state, as well practices which sacrificed their land, also sanctioned by the state,
abounded, and the mining industry in Appalachia flourished. Coal production would remain
isolated in the central Appalachian states because of resource unavailability or, at the least,
limitation in other areas. As a result, while the West Virginia coal fields were experiencing their
height, southern Appalachia had not yet been economically impacted to the same degree by
industrial change. Throughout the process stark economic, political, environmental, legal, and
social developments, all occurring during this period, acted as the shifting foundation for
completion of capitalist change. (Erikson, 1976).
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Coal increased the pace of economic development, aided by federal scale
interventions that benefitted capital. Coal development on Scotts Run flourished rapidly starting
with the mining of the first ton of coal there. By 1917, the price of coal had stabilized when the
Federal Fuel Administration set the price for soft coal at $2.58 per ton. (Eller, 1982). This
influence by the state on the market, referenced above, marks the first state intervention into the
capitalist process noted here. If we are to adopt Smith's traditional state scaling, this intervention
took place at the national scale.
Like the remainder of West Virginia, when coal development on Scotts Run saw
its greatest growth it was fueled by demand resulting from World War I. The industry also
expanded so rapidly because of incentives to take coal to market at low rates offered by the
railroads to encourage an increase in coal traffic on the rails. (Thomas, 1998). Any operator
who could get coal cars could sell his coal. (Eller, 1982, p. 155). By 1920, the wartime Federal
Fuel Administration released price controls, and at times coal sold at or near fourteen dollars per
ton, a comparatively very high price which marked the second intervention at this same federal
scale. Later the federal government again would institute a third intervention in the form of price
controls, and the price of coal again would plummet. (Eller, 1982, p. 156). Smaller mines often
operated at peak production during times of high demand, but when the price of coal decreased
they often closed down, and economic growth correspondingly slowed. (Eller, 1982, p. 153).
After 1927 prices would fall, not because of regulation, but with demand, and the period of more
rapid industrialization would end in favor of a return to slower advances. (Eller, 1982, p. 157).
Wages also impacted economic conditions over time, again aided by federal
interventions. Non-union competition made operation of union mines difficult, labor relations
were strained, and violence erupted in the West Virginia coal fields. (Lee, 1969). Demand for
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coal decreased during the 1920's; production and wages decreased with it. The miners suffered.
By 1927, miners were making less than their 1917 wages. Between 1923 and 1927 over 200,000
miners left the coal fields. (Eller, 1982). Per capita wages of miners dropped from $851 in 1923
to $235 by 1933. These changes compounded already poor economic and social conditions.
Likewise, mechanization of the coal industry resulted in the even more lost jobs and the
attendant temporal decline of industrialization. Industries such as textiles and timber would
experience similar uneven progressions (Lewis, 1998, and Williams, 2001).
Regardless, coal continue to be king in Appalachia as the deep mining and surface
mining of the state continued, largely in the hands of large operators, through the turn of the
millennium. But a new development in coal was just around the corner. The time had arrived
for the introduction of mountaintop removal. With the introduction of mountaintop removal we
see the introduction of state spatial practices at scales other than the federal regulatory scale,
illustrating flexible rescaling at work in Appalachia again for another land acquisition.
If we return to Lewis's theory that Appalachian industrialization is an ongoing
process, we can continue to examine that industrialization as it reached a point of crisis when
traditional mining in West Virginia declined and when operators began to fear the exhaustion of
resources attainable by deep mining. We then see the emergence, through state spatial practices
that amount to heavy facilitation by the state, of another dispossession of land in the form of the
relatively new practice of mountaintop removal.

This dispossession is an example of the

accumulation by dispossession that Harvey noted as distinguishable from original or primitive
accumulation by its role in ongoing dispossession meant to avert capitalist crisis.
In its simplest explanation, mountaintop removal is a form of surface mining.
The surface of a mountaintop is “removed” to allow for the extraction of a coal seam at the
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surface. The land above the coal seam is moved to an adjacent valley, and the valley is filled in
with the land removed from the top of the seam. The process usually occurs through high impact
blasting. Often more than 100 meters of dirt and rock are removed from the top of the mountain
with explosives to allow the exposure and extraction of the coal seam. (Burns, 2007).
Mountaintop removal has been the subject of significant public and legal
opposition. (House and Howard, 2009). State spatial practices at the federal level that changed
existing federal legislation allowed the process in the first instance, so like traditional mining,
initial state involvement begins at the federal scale. In 1977, the enactment of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act, amounted to a spatial practice
by Congress at the federal scale. The stated purpose of the action was to “restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters. (Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 1977). The Clean Water Act allows the obtaining of a permit to place “fill
material” into waters of the United States, provided that the primary purpose of the “filling” was
not for waste disposal. (Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 1977). As written, therefore, the
Clean Water Act prohibited Mountaintop removal, because no valley fills were allowed for
disposal of Mountaintop removal “waste.” However, in 2002, the Army Corps of Engineers
which issues the permits for the dumping of “fill material” into American waterways, at the
behest of the Bush administration, absent congressional approval, which was not required for
such amendment, changed the longstanding definition of “fill material,” and included or
redesignated mining residues as a defined “fill material” rather than waste, officially sanctioning
mountaintop removal and flexibly rescaling to take the power away from the Clean Water Act
and laterally shifting power, bringing its control under the umbrella of the Army Corps of
Engineers.
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When the Army Corps of Engineers changed the definition of “fill material” we
see an example, for the first time of lateral flexible rescaling. The Corp operates, as does
Congress, at the federal scale, but the actions of Congress would have disallowed mountaintop
removal mining. Capital needed mountaintop removal mining to spur the coal industry, and help
for capital came not from a scalar shift up or down, but from a flexible lateral rescaling. Power
remained at the federal scale but moved from the legislative to the executive branch.
Since that time, the Appalachia Restoration Act has been introduced in the Senate
in an attempt to restore the original meaning of fill material in the Clean Water Act and to return
mining debris to the category of waste, as well as to shift power back laterally from the executive
to the legislative branch. (Appalachian Restoration Act). The Appalachian Restoration Act
suggests a definition of fill material be added to the Clean Water Act, which would include an
exclusion from fill material of “the disposal of excess spoil material (as described in Section
515(b)(22) of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act….” (Appalachian Restoration
Act).
The state is spatially active in other areas on mountaintop removal than just
permitting. After active mining has been completed federal law requires that the disturbed areas
of the mining operation by “reclaimed.” This requirement originates out of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977(SMCRA), referenced above. (Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act, 1977). The Act was enacted at a time when mountaintop removal was not yet
in practice. Ultimately the Act allowed for two dispossessions of land: the dispossession of
actual land which is mined as well as the dispossession of attendant resources through adjacent
valley fills and through use or consumption or destruction of public water resources. There is
one federal scale state spatial practice at work that results in two spatial impacts that benefit
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capital.
The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that by 2012, two decades of
mountaintop removal will have destroyed or degraded 11.5 percent of the forests in West
Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, and Tennessee, an area larger than Delaware, and that mountaintop
removal waste will have buried more than 1,000 miles of streams. (Mountaintop Mining
Programmatic EIS, 2005). Smithsonian author John McQuaid observed “I've reported on
devastation around the world—from natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, to wars in
Central America and the Middle East, to coastlines in Asia degraded by fish farming. But in the
sheer audacity of its destruction, mountaintop coal removal is the most shocking thing I've ever
seen. Entering a mountaintop site is like crossing into a war zone.” (McQuaid, 2009). Facts like
these and the opponents they create caused the shift away from lateral rescaling that becomes
evident when we examine challenges to mountaintop removal.
Political and legal opposition to the new method of mining developed, but the
state continued to flexibly rescale as necessary. McQuaid notes the state level support for capital
that would underlie challenges as that scale, stating that “West Virginia's political establishment
has been unwavering in its support for the coal industry.” (McQuaid, 2009). West Virginia
Governor Joe Manchin also spoke on the state scale support of the industry stating at a Coal
Association meeting "Government should be your ally, not your adversary," illustrating flexible
rescaling at work to rescale to the state scale from the federal scale with permitting control then
in the hands of the Army Corps of Engineers to allow such dispossessions. (McQuaid, 2009).
In 1990, at the federal level, amendments to the Clean Water Act established a
requirement that there be "no net loss of wetlands." (Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 1990).
In conjunction with mountaintop removal, to valley fill, a coal company must obtain a permit
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from the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps is charged with evaluating the
environmental impact as well as any required remedial action as a result thereof before issuing
such a permit. The corresponding National Environmental Policy Act can also require a detailed
environmental impact statement to be completed before a permit is issued.

(National

Environmental Policy Act, 1969). But coal companies have obtained the required permits
without the Corp actually evaluating possible environmental impacts. These instances have been
challenged in West Virginia in front of Judge Chambers of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia. Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, et al. v. U.S. Army
Corps. of Engineers, et al.
In that matter Plaintiffs, the Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, requested that
the Federal District Court find that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers violated the Clean Water
Act and the National Environmental Policy Act by issuing four permits to fill headwater streams
in conjunction with mountaintop removal coal mining. Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, et
al. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, et al. In a 2007, decision in that case, Judge Chambers’
opinion amounted to a state spatial practice at the state scale. The opinion stated that "the Corps
has failed to take a hard look at the destruction of headwater streams and failed to evaluate their
destruction as an adverse impact on aquatic resources in conformity with its own regulations and
policies," but the opinion allowed ongoing mountaintop removal projects to proceed. Ohio
Valley Environmental Coalition, et al. v. U.S. Army Corps. of Engineers, et al. The case was
appealed the case to the historically conservative Virginia-based United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, at yet another scale—the regional scale- which had already acted to allow
mountaintop removal mining in other instances.
Another Southern District Judge, The Honorable Charles H. Haden II, after
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visiting a mountaintop removal mining site in southern West Virginia, noted:
[M]ined sites were visible from miles away. The sites stood out
among the natural wooded ridges as huge white plateaus, and the
valley fills appeared as massive, artificially landscaped stair steps.
Compared to the thick hardwoods of surrounding undisturbed hills,
the mine sites appeared stark and barren and enormously different
from the original topography.
Bragg v. Robertson.

Nonetheless, mountaintop removal mining continues, aided by the

continual shifts in power up and down between the federal, regional, and state scales and
laterally within scales that remain a part of the state’s active spatial practice of flexible rescaling
capable of advancing the interests of capital.
"Industrialization has integrated the mountains into the dominant economy of the
country as a whole, and it has rendered the region increasingly subject to the fluctuations of the
national market system." (Eller, 1982, p. 227). As a result, what started as a local industry has
fallen under national control as flexible scaling revealed itself within the mining industry.
Despite withdrawal of consent and state support during the union battles of the early twentieth
century, the state has now reappeared as capital’s ally as flexible rescaling shifts power again.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
This dissertation has developed the new concept of flexible rescaling as a means
of attempting to fill the prior gap in the literature left by the under-theorized role of the state in
uneven development. As a researcher I admittedly have been influenced by my own liberal
social tendencies, but what has emerged: evidence of and conceptualization and theoretical
development of the active and deliberate state spatial practice of flexible rescaling that is
employed by the state to impact uneven development to the benefit of capital absent a need for a
formal restructuring of power or of the state which might result in resistance if not crisis,
advances the theory of the state’s role in uneven development.
I chose the examples that illustrate the theory, because I thought they would
provide a cohesiveness. This cohesiveness is achieved, because the examples are all from within
Appalachia and the examples are all based in land practices. Returning to dialectics, these are
the two most important identities of the examples which ultimately allow their differences to be
better understood.
In choosing the examples to illustrate the theory it was also important to me to
choose examples that impacted both accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by
expanded reproduction.

The eminent domain examples here meet that requirement.

The

example of high voltage power transmission lines and the attendant dispossessions demonstrates
more traditional accumulation by dispossession, and the example of mountaintop removal, while
still illustrative of accumulation by dispossession of the commons, is more demonstrative of a
state spatial practice that allows accumulation by expanded reproduction, in that case mining.
Finally, in choosing examples it was important to me to choose examples that
would illustrate conventional expansion for expansion’s sake, illustrated by the transfer of land
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to capital for power line construction, and that would illustrate expansion as a means to avert a
capital crisis, illustrated by mountaintop removal.
Recent events have made me consider research regarding the flexible rescaling
brought about by the 2010 BP gulf oil spill where, to me, flexible rescaling can already be seen.
Federal government allocation of funds to assist victims of the spill in lieu of that aid coming
from BP amounts to a spatial practice that results in a redistribution of resources that benefits
capital. Even if some individuals or entities receive relief from any state fund that is created, if
they eventually become stakeholders in an action against BP, then BP will legally be entitled to a
credit set-off for any monies paid to the victims to make them whole. The law acts to prevent a
windfall, and, in doing so, it flexibly rescales power to benefit capital.
In examining what this dissertation is and is not, I return to my acknowledgment
that the dissertation was never meant to be a new comprehensive theory of the state or of uneven
development. After using the theorizations to date, I am not convinced a completely new and
comprehensive theory of either is needed, but, to be sure, such a theorization is a life’s work, not
a dissertation.
During my research I discovered that a transfer of power by the state in order to
flexibly rescale can be accomplished not only by movement of power up and down through the
system, but also through lateral rescaling- a type of flexible rescaling I had not considered when
I set out to develop this theory and which was not included in my proposal. As I postulated
before writing the dissertation, the ability inherent within the state to flexibly rescale results in a
system where the state can employ the active spatial practice of rescaling to control uneven
development to the benefit of capital. What I did not expect was for power to travel laterally with
similar result, a discovery that I think advances the theory and proves its applicability and utility
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even more than I anticipated.
As a result, it is apparent that flexible rescaling occurs between and within scales.
Within scales flexible rescaling occurs laterally, as was demonstrated with the case of
mountaintop removal mining where changes between the legislative and executive policy at the
federal level occurred. Between scales flexible rescaling occurs as anticipated, when power
moves up and down between scales, best illustrated with examples that show appeals within the
inherently stratified legal system at work to change policy to benefit capital.
Regardless of whether flexible rescaling is lateral or stratified, the active spatial
practices of the state, through both action and decided inaction, amount to shifts in power that
benefit capital and illustrate and develop the active spatial role of the state in impacting uneven
development. The inherent flexibility within the system does not require a formal restructuring
for either lateral or stratified shifts in power. As a result, flexible rescaling is a powerful tool by
which the state actively engages in spatial practices that benefit capital and impact uneven
development as a result.
During the research proposal I identified several questions which, looking back on
my research to date, remain unanswered or lack full development. Some are explicitly noted
within the dissertation, such as the benefit of additional research into ruling class control of the
media and propaganda and what role that control plays in securing legitimation and/or consent,
as well as how that control itself is fostered by the state as a secondary aspect of flexible
rescaling.
Other questions emerged when examining the conceptual development. During
the actual research it became apparent to me that more in depth case studies might allow the
dialectical method to reveal itself better and might allow for a better understanding of the
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interconnections between the state’s actions and capital. More in depth case studies might also
allow time to address some of the issues identified previously in my research proposal which
were not answered or parsed out to my satisfaction in this dissertation. For example, while my
proposal postulated that Harvey’s theory of imperialist practices could be expanded from his
chosen international scale to the intranational scale, ultimately this dissertation spent more time
developing the new concept of flexible rescaling than it did attempting to alter the scale of
Harvey’s theory and testing whether such alternation survives theoretically.

While the

dissertation conducts examination on an intranational scale and recognizes that the engines that
drive power processes on that intranational scale are money, productive capacity, and regulatory
power, only regulatory power is examined at any length herein.
The time required over the past six years to read, research, and, most importantly,
synthesize a new conceptual development like flexible rescaling prevented the type of in depth
case study that might later reveal more about the theory. Theoretical development was also
necessary before such a detailed case study could be undertaken. The process of developing the
theory and exemplifying it further refined the theory making it more appropriate for
consideration as part of an in depth case study going forward than it might have been for this
dissertation.
Additionally, the theory developed explains how the state shifts power to benefit
capital, but there is a Marxist analysis waiting in the wings as to why the state shifts power to
benefit capital; the inclusion of Massey’s work and Howitt’s work on connections and relations
was used and useful in the process of the theoretical development but could be revisited as the
theory is tested and developed further; and the role of consent as well as identity formation could
be further developed by examining the impact of consent, or lack thereof, on additional spatial
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practices and the impact of flexible rescaling on level and nature of consent.
The use of dialectics in the dissertation proved to be a good choice, but I struggled
with how explicit to make the appearance and use of its abstractions so as to not become too
positivist in my analysis. While dialectics can itself appear formulaic and over-structured with
its lists of relations, modes of abstraction, levels of generality, and laws of the dialectic, at the
same time- to me- it seems almost too flexible and hard to pin down precisely, because it is
designed to reflect the changing nature of things and the ever-shifting relationships between
them. Move your focus ever so slightly and your whole analysis can change. Keep your focus
steadfast and risk defeating the point of a relational analysis. Deciding that Ollman himself did
not make explicit reference to the methodology of dialectics with frequency in his examples, I
decided to allow the abstractions to reveal themselves except where I could not resist including a
strong example of dialectics at work or except where I felt the need to be explicit in order to
justify the use of dialectics or to illustrate the benefit of the use of dialectics.
Hopefully the development of the new theory of flexible rescaling adds
significantly to the geographic literature to date on the state’s spatial role in uneven development
and to the theory of uneven development generally. Hopefully additional research will reveal
even more about the role the state plays and why.
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